Assessment of the results of the May 2014 European elections

The Plenary of the Central Committee of AKEL which convened last Saturday 6th July 2014, unanimously approved the following assessment of the results of the May 2014 European elections:

 

 

ASSESSMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF AKEL

ON THE 2014 ELECTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

 

AKEL C.C. Press Office, 8th July 2014, Nicosia

 

 

INTRODUCTION:

 

1. Bearing in mind all the developments that have taken place since July 2011 and onwards, as well as the unprecedented hostile climate we were confronted with in the last three years, the result we achieved is judged under the circumstances to be satisfactory. More specifically, we fulfilled the two principal goals we had set for these elections. Firtsly, the re-election of 2 MEP’s and secondly, maintaining AKEL’s leading role in our country’s political and social affairs and struggles.

 

The election result refuted the wishful thinking of many circles and forces who were expecting a dramatic reduction in AKEL’s election strength to a degree that our Party would enter into an non-reversable process of political marginalisation.

 

2. At the same time, the election result of the European elections of 25th May 2014 has recorded a significant fall in our Party’s percentages and votes in comparison both to the 2009 European elections and the 2011 Parliamentary elections. Despite the loss of votes, the result of 27% we have achieved is in percentage terms slightly higher than the results of the first round of the 2013 Presidential elections.

 

3. The fact that our Part withstood, did not yield and remained strong so that it can have a decisive influence on political and economic developments, despite the unprecedented adverse atmosphere and conditions, is due to three basic factors:

 

–          The enduring timeless presence of the Party is directly linked with its correct policy, positions, proposals and initiatives, as the main pole of resistance to the anti-social Memoranda policies of the Anastasiades-DISY party government.

–          The result is also directly connected with the hard work of the cadres, members and friends of the Party, who despite the quantative reduction in numbers of those who worked, gave their best.

 

–          The behaviour of the Party’s electoral grass roots reconfirmed AKEL’s deep roots in Cypriot society.

 

The political environment in which we waged the election battle

 

General conclusions

 

4. The most fundamental and new characteristic of these elections was the dramatic deterioration of the country’s economic situation as a result of the decisions taken by Anastasiades-Eurogroup in March 2013.

 

The tragic consequences of the Memoranda policies on our people, more specifically on the working people, youth and the vulnerable groups of the population, had resulted in creating feelings of even more intense disappointment, which rose to even rage among a big section of the people directed towards the entire political system and to institutions.

 

5. The disappointment and rage were accompanied to a large extent by a growing fatalism, which was also intensified as a result not only of the complete lack of trust towards the political system, but also due to the coordinated efforts by the government, DISY party and a large section of the mass media to cultivate an atmosphere of obedient submission to the Troika amongst the Cypriot people and that there is no alternative path whatsoever other than the Memorandum.

 

6. As a consequence of this given situation, the aphoristic outlook of a large section of voters arguing that “all the parties are the same” and that “by voting and participating in the elections nothing whatsover will change” increased.

 

7. The European elections had their own seperate characteristics in all the EU countries, mainly with regards the lower participation in comparison to elections of a national character. The increased abstention recorded in the European elections is not only enhanced by the usual causes reproducing this phenomenon, such as apathy and the denigration of political participation and struggle. Abstention is higher on the one hand due to the increased depreciation of the role of these elections, a consequence of the democratic deficits of the EU. At the same time, as a result of the anti-social policies being imposed, in the minds of a section of voters this stand represents a form of expressing a depreciation and denigration of the European Union itself, in whom the peoples trust in Cyprus as well is at its lowest level historically, given that it does not exceed 30%.

 

8. As expected, issues relating to national interest and not European issues dominated the political agenda, despite the fact that our people is suffering from the worst kind of “therapy” the European friends of DISY and Anastasiades had imposed on us.

 

 

Special conclusions

 

1. Factors that had a negative influence on AKEL’s efforts

 

9. During the election campaign an attempt was made by the rest of the political forces, with the contribution of the vast majority of the mass media as we, to exploit politically and/or gain electoral benefits to the detriment of AKEL, from the impressions and convictions that had been promoted in the last three years amongst a significant section of public opinion, together with a part of our electoral grass-roots too, that it is the Christofias government and AKEL who are responsible, or at least equally to blame, for the devastating developments in the economy.

 

1. The dire economic situation which has led tens of thousands of households even to destitution, in combination with the previously mentioned, significantly increased the degree of difficulty we had to face in this election campaign.

 

1. In the 15 months that have passed since the election of Anastasiades, the Government, the DISY party and the majority of the mass media have all sought to create and keep high on the agenda issues that directly or indirectly relate to AKEL in an unprecedented campaign to slander and weaken it.

 

2. The previously mentioned, in conjuction with the attacks we came under and which concerned the moral standing of the party, exacerbated the aphoristic perceptions that “all the parties are the same”. The cost for a Party of our type and character is objectively disproportionate when this impression is created amongst a respectable percentage of public opinion. We as AKEL also have our own share of responsibility for the formation of this perception, not only because we do not sufficiently highlight in all cases our qualative difference from the other political forces, but also because for some years now negative phenomena and practices have surfaced within our own ranks, without us managing to combat them effectively. We can refer, for example, to the development of relations based on cronyism, self-promotion, in many cases an adaptation to the logic of “soundbites” rather than the substance, a tendency among our cadres to behave in a way and a culture that does not enable them to be considered as examples that should be followed.

 

3. The looming from the beginning increased trend towards abstention exerted disproportionately greater pressure on AKEL because of:

 

–          The increased representation of AKEL among the unemployed, the popular strata and in general among all those affected most by the impact of the crisis which according to the research conducted abstained in greater numbers in the elections.

 

– The increased representation of AKEL in those exercising strongly critical views on the EU and in those wrongly believing that the best way of expressing thisopinion is to turn their backs on the electoral procedure.

 

14. The phenomenon of mass abstention although assuming a horizontal diemnsion, nonetheless cannot but concern us in particular, since for various reasons tens of thousands of our voters chose not to confirm their relationship with our Party. Of course a number of members and a significant section of our voters that abstained did so consciously as a result of the damaged credibility and lack of trust in AKEL.

 

5. The vast majoroity of the mass media continued with a far greater ferocity than usual the biased and hostile stand towards AKEL. Front page news, main television news highlights and morning radio programmes all played a negative role, given that in the majoroty of cases they were serving DISY party and the governments policy.

 

In this context, they sought, and to a great extdent, succeeded in promoting the substance of DISY’s communicatrion policy, which due to the high levels of support it had among its voters from early on aimed not to only to avoid confrontation with AKEL, but in general also to avoid creating a pre-election atmosphere. This explains why topical issues prevailed over the pre-election agenda, almost right up until the end of the election campaign.

 

6. The particulalry adverse economic conditions, as well as the labour and social insecurity many of our voters are experiencing, contributed towards expressing, with an even greater intensity, their disatisfaction with their personal demands not being satisfied, particulalry during the period of our administration.

 

7. The negative for our Party political environment in which the elections took place highlighted our long-lasting weakness in the organisational field as well, resulting in the participation of even fewer numbers of comrades in the task of personal contact with the people.

 

8. Whilst from the outset we did not have any exagerated aspirations about the support we would receive from the Turish Cypriots living in the occupied areas, nonetheless the election result falls short of the assessments we had made, based on our contacts and activities. The reasons must be examined in a seperate assessment, whilst the wider issue of the relations with the progressive forces in the Turkish Cypriot community must also concern us in an organised way.

 

1. Factors that had a postive impact in our efforts

 

9. The deeply anti-social policies of the DISY-Anastasiades government, the  Eurogroup-Anastasiades decisions of March 2013, the autocratic and arrogant behaviour of the government and ruling forces, and the actions to completely overun and manipulate the state machinery and institutions and the general negative picture of the government created intense disatisfaction among the majority of our people. For all of these reasons mentioned previously, the preconditions for AKEL to benefit from this disatisfaction were not created. However, the actions and policies of the government created the preconditions to elevate AKEL as the main political force that can effectively combat the government’s anti-social policies and protect the people, workers and vulnerable groups of the population from the attempt to abolish our people’s labour and social gains.

 

1. Through constant, persistent and admittedly particulalry difficult efforts, we managed to restore to some degree the truth surrounding the real causes of the economic destruction in our country. More specifically, almost everyone now accepts the decisive responsibilities of the bankers, the economic oligarchy and the then Governor of the Central Bank.

 

1. During the election campaign, we made an intense effort to project our positions and highlight the initiatives we took as AKEL towards this end, to resist the Memoranda policies of the govewrnment, aiming at protecting the popular strata.

 

Subsequently, we managed, particulalrly towards the end of the campaign, both through our public interventions, but also through our personal contacts with the people, to highlight the danger and negative consequences for the working people, the popular strata and society in general from an electoral strengthening of DISY and on the other hand without a sufficiently strong and capable AKEL existing to resist the government’s anti-social policies.

 

2. The fierce critical approach of our people towards the EU, which has risen to unprecedented levels of questioning also as a result of the attacks we came under in March 2013, objectively created a favourable political climate for projecting our own alternative proposal and philosophy about the character and direction of the EU. Furthermore, the fact that the responsibility for the “therapy” that was imposed on Cyprus, but also for the character of the EU lies primarily with the political allies and friends of Anastasiades and DISY also strengthened our own arguments. However, the downgrading of the European dimension in the political agenda of the elections did not permit the greatest possible utilisatrion of this favourable given situation. In addition, the need for the further elaboration of our alternative proposal for the EU was highlighted.

 

3. The consistent, responsible and patriotic stand of our Party with regards the developments on the Cyprus problem contributed positively to the electoral result we registered. At the same time, the balanced crticism of the government’s handling of the Cyprus problem, without however a

disposition for compromises with those who want to undermine any chance for a solution,did not allow those sought so, to impose their position about a supposed common ground between AKEL and DISY on the Cyprus problem.

 

4. Despite the reduced number of party members who participated in the work of personal contact with the people, but also the delay that existed in fulfilling this duty, it must be pointed out that the comrades worked with zeal and selflessness devoting many forces so that the serious difficulties among our voters could be reversed. In the end, their hard work was vindicated, since we managed to reduce the abstention rate among AKEL voters well below the average rate.
5. Having this in mind, whilst the phenomenon of abstention and the loss of tens of thousands of our voters is indeed extremely worrying, at the same time the fact that the majority of all those who did not vote for us did not vote for other parties enables us with better comparatrive preconditions to work towards restoring the relationship, but also for many people their trust towards the Party.

 

6. We assess as positive the participation of the candidate list in the election campaign, both at the level of personal contact and at the level of representation in the mass media.

 

7. The contribution of friends of the Party was also positive, both in terms of quality and in some cases of quantity, in the sense of practical work, either to take voters to the polling station, through their articles and interventions in the mass media, social networks and others.

 

Conclusions

 

8. Analyzing in an objective manner the prevailing conditions, the political and social climate in which the election campaign took place, the result can be judged as satisfactory. Our Party resisted and withstood the all-out attack unleashed against it and achieved a dignified percentage result from the elections. However under no circumstances can the fact of the fall in the electoral strength of AKEL in comparison to the 2009 European elections and 2011 Parliamentary elections be written off, as well as the big loss of votes in absolute numbers.

 

9. The European elections have completed a cycle that began with the election of comrade Demetris Christofias to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus. The European elections were the first election battle waged after the election of Anastasiades to the Presidency. As a Party we went through an extremely difficult phase where all the attacks were focused on us; where on a day-to-day basis the Left was being judged as being guilty at the level of ideas and policies.  This attempt of course did not end there. Its goal was not just to remove Demetris Christofias and AKEL from power. The goal was to weaken once and for all the ideology of the Left itself, the only genuine and powerfull obstacle to the policies of austerity and subordination of our people.

 

1. As we had also pointed out during the preelection campaign, the period of grace for the Anastasiades government and the Democratic Rally party is coming to an end. The same is true for their lies which are being revealed. Now they will not be able to convince by blaming geveryting on the previous government. The Cypriot people are facing many problems today; crucial problems that need to be addressed and not the shifting of responsibilities elsewhere. That is to say a new cycle in our country’s political affairs has began.

 

1. Day by day the Anastasiades government’s inability to fulfill all that it pledged to the people is being exposed. However under no circumstances does this mean that this fact alone will operate in AKEL’s favour as the main force of the opposition. An overall counter-proposal of the Left is demanded, that will not only resist the government’s policies but will continue and intensify the elaboration of convincing political proposals that will lead to an exit from the existing situation. This is how we will win again the trust of the people and our credibility.

 

32.AKEL must convince the people – not through verbal declarations, but through  practical actions and activities – that it is different from the other political forces. AKEL must convince with its consistency to pro-people and patriotic positions; through our personal and political example; convince that the people can trust us in the struggle for a better future.

 

33.We must stand steadfastly at the forefront of the struggle against the anti-people policies; against those policies included both in the Memorandum and those being implemented by the Anastasiades-Rally party government on the pretext of the Memorandum. With the same determination, we must also resist the by now customary blackmail exterted by the Governmentevery time it  seeks the approval of its policies in the House of Representatives, calling on the political parties to operate as a delegation of the Troika in Cyprus.

 

34. AKEL must be at the forefront politically of the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem; to consolidate the front of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots,through political intiatives that will remind on a daily basis the need for the peaceful cohabitation of our people.

 

35. Furthermore, we need to win again the trust of the people with regards our political and human ethos; to convince that we do not exist to be served by the people, but that we exist to serve the people; that we are not guided by any personal ambitions, vanity and personal gain.

 

36. The Party must substantially strengthen its daily contact with the people at all levels. The reconstruction of our party mechanism is a parallel and not less important procedure.

 

37. To fulfil all of these goals, an overal comprehensive strategic plan is needed, as well as the effective control of its implementation; a plan on a political and organisational level that must be formulated as soon as possible so that AKEL can regain the force it has lost, widen and strengthen its relations of trust with its electoral grass roots, but also with the working people and society in general.

 

38. Restoring trust in AKEL, the strengthening of its credibility, effectiveness and influence has never been an end in itself in the almost 90 years of existence of our Party. Our sole motive and aspiration remains the struggle to serve in the best possible way the working people, the young generation, the vulnerable groups of the population, the small and middle strata and our people and Cypriot society in general.