Press Conference by the General Secretary of the C.C. of AKEL Andros Kyprianou on the critical developments surrounding the Cyprus problem
Hilton Hotel, Nicosia
AKEL C.C. Press Office, 26 November 2018, Nicosia
I welcome you all to today’s press conference. Developments surrounding the Cyprus problem will to a great extent determine the future and perspective of our country and people, the lives of our children and grandchildren. None of us can and is entitled to be indifferent in view of such critical and decisive developments. Let alone AKEL, which is a patriotic and responsible force.
For AKEL, our unnegotiable and timeless goal has been, and remains, the liberation and reunification of our homeland and people as a whole. The only way we can realize this goal is our persistence on the agreed framework for one state, with a single sovereignty, a single international personality and a single citizenship; on a solution of a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality as defined in numerous resolutions of the Security Council, one state that will be a continuation of the Republic of Cyprus, free of the occupation, guarantees and intervention rights and foreign and domestic armies.
None of us is in any doubt that the main responsibility for the continuation of the de facto partition is borne by Turkey. However, the reality is that from time to time mistakes have been made by the Greek Cypriot side, with Mont Peleran and Crans Montana as recent examples.
It is a fact that for 44 years we haven’t managed to solve the Cyprus problem on the abovementioned agreed basis. Certain forces and circles put forwards this argument so that they can claim that the goal of a bicommunal, bizonal federation solution is unfeasible and that we should seek a unitary state solution.
If the goal of a federal solution is unfeasible, how can the much more ambitious and extremely difficult goal such as a unitary state solution be possible? Particularly in today’s conditions, it is obvious that the real dilemma is not between federation and a unitary state, but between federation and partition. Now, the idea of abandoning federation seems to be even discussed in high places as well, the alternative option that is being discussed is certainly not a unitary state, but a form of partition.
The time has come for those forces and circles who, in good faith, believed that the rejection of the federal solution could lead to a unitary state, to reflect and have second thoughts. If we draw lessons from the past then we will easily come to this conclusion. It’s enough to think back to the events that preceded the twin crime committed in 1974 and its outcome.
Consequently, the rejection of a federal solution beyond any doubt leads to partition. There are two ways to be led to partition. One is to engage in negotiations with the aim of agreeing to it. The other is to permit time to pass by without any substantive negotiations, resulting in sliding towards partition.
But what does partition mean?
Does it mean that things will remain as they are today and that life will go on as normal?
It’s a dangerously naïve to believe that. The Turkish Cypriots themselves, with whom AKEL is discussing on a perpetual basis, believe that if the current situation continues, the Turkish Cypriot community will be completely absorbed by Turkey and that it will disappear as an entity.
Partition means conceding almost 40% of the territory and 60% of the coastline, therefore also a corresponding percentage of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus, to Turkey.
Partition means Cyprus would have a 180 km long border with Turkey.
Partition means the eternal staying of all the settlers and the uncontrolled further colonialization (of the occupied areas).
Partition means the eternal staying of Turkey’s occupying troops.
Partition means we won’t take back not one inch of land, nor a single property.
Partition ultimately means that the Sword of Damocles of the whole of Cyprus being seized by Turkey will forever be hanging over our heads.
After the collapse of the Crans Montana conference, the Secretary General of the UN made reference to a period of reflection. The stalemate is unfortunately continuing to this day. What has UNSG Mr. Guterres called for so that the negotiations can resume? He called for the self-evident, namely meaningful talks, as well as the demonstration of the necessary political will so that we can reach an agreement. He did not stick to this general conclusion. In reality, he called for the continuation of the negotiation procedure from the point where it had remained at Crans Montana, namely with the safeguarding of the convergence achieved to date, the Guterres framework and the mechanism for implementing the solution.
As far as the procedure is concerned, the UN Secretary General called for a cross-negotiation of six key issues which he indeed defined to be discussed on two tables. On one table the international aspects of the Cyprus problem will be discussed, with the participation of the guarantor powers and the European Union as an observer. On the other table, the internal aspects between the two communities will be discussed as they have always been. If we achieve convergence on these six issues, we will subsequently reach a strategic understanding – and not an interim agreement as some forces and circles are erroneously contending. This will facilitate enormously the subsequent discussion of the remaining outstanding issues.
So the Presidential Palace should therefore stop asking us repeatedly like some broken record disc what AKEL proposes. I repeat for the umpteenth time. We simply, proposed very clearly and openly the acceptance of what the Secretary General of the UN called for without appendixes, footnotes and preconditions. We don’t support this position just because Mr. Gutierrez has called for it. The UN Secretary General’s proposal is not at all accidental. It is the most effective way to continue the procedure.
Permit me to explain what I mean. All the chapters of the Cyprus problem are now at an advanced stage of convergence. This is what the Secretary General noted in the Report he submitted after the collapse at Crans Montana in September 2017. In reality, there were only a few differences left in each chapter; differences that demanded political decisions to be taken. This now enables cross negotiation. Cross and simultaneous negotiation does not permit intermittent “protaxis” policies (Note: the policy of setting “preconditions” that predetermine the results of negotiations), what needs to be discussed first and what to do next. Lastly, negotiation of the six key issues eliminates the danger of getting lost in details and wasting unnecessary time, as was often the case.
The above explain why the UN Secretary General insisted on his proposal. He did not suggest it due to some impulse, but for very substantive reasons. AKEL had submitted a similar proposal to Mr. Anastasiades at the Geneva conference for exactly the same reasons, but unfortunately our proposal wasn’t taken into consideration.
Does the Guterres Framework protect us or should we worry about its provisions?
Mr. Anastasiades himself said during his latest press conference that it would be insane if he were to reject it. The Framework abolishes guarantees and intervention rights from day one of the solution. It provides for a drastic reduction of the occupation troops also from day one and for a speedy withdrawal of the rest. It provides for a mechanism to implement the solution, from which it excludes the guarantor powers and restricts them just to an advisory role. It leaves the issue of the Greek Force in Cyprus ELDYK and the Turkish Force in Cyprus TOURDYK (950 and 650 soldiers respectively) open for further discussion, with Turkey calling for a review clause in 15 years and the Greek Cypriot side calling for a termination clause for their presence in only a few years.
The above constitutes a significant improvement even in relation to the Zurich agreements: The big thorny issue, the Treaty of Guarantee is terminated, while even in the worst case scenario for us, the Treaty of Alliance is transformed from an indefinite into a fixed timeframe.
As far as the issue of territory is concerned, the Guterres framework calls for the return of Morphou. This means that the Turkish Cypriot side must not only bring back the map (on territory) it withdrew, but add Morphou to it as well.
On the issue of the equal treatment of Greek and Turkish citizens, the Framework simply refers to equal treatment, something which leaves room for negotiation, with our significant weapon being the Christofias – Talat convergence for a population ratio of 4: 1.
Regarding the issue of effective participation, the Framework meets our position, given that for bodies dealing with secondary political matters (the basics were agreed – now Mr. Anastasiades appears to want to reopen them as well), the Framework refers to a positive Turkish Cypriot vote, with a mechanism for solving deadlocks, only on issues that concern the vital interests of the two communities. That is, what Mr. Anastasiades wants to supposedly safeguard with decentralized Federation is already ensured.
As regards the property issue, the Secretary General proposes two different regimes, which was the objective of the Greek Cypriot side. In the areas to be returned under Greek Cypriot administration, priority will be given to displaced owners. As to the other areas, users will be given priority. The latter obviously relates to the ECHR’s Demopoulos ruling, which, unfortunately, does indeed give unprecedented priority to the users. It is of course something that doesn’t satisfy us, but at least the Framework explicitly offers the possibility for further negotiation. In addition, the convergence must also be utilized according to which even in the areas that won’t be returned priority will be given to those owners who have an emotional connection to their property.
Of course, no UN framework can 100% meet our own positions. An overall assessment must be made. The balance weighs heavily on the positive, bearing in mind that the Treaty of Guarantee and intervention rights are abolished, the occupying troops are to be withdrawn with a credible mechanism for implementation, Morphou is returned, and the Greek Cypriot position for a positive vote is satisfied. Consequently, the Guterres Framework shields us in view of a final negotiation.
If we had proceeded with the Framework, there were two possible scenarios: Either Turkey would cooperate for a significant step to be taken towards the solution of the Cyprus problem, or Turkey to insist on unacceptable positions and to be exposed before the Secretary General and the international community.
That is why, when the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Akinci called for a resumption of the negotiations last April from where they had remained on the basis of the Guterres Framework, AKEL had pointed out that Mr. Anastasiades should have done the same too. Instead, the President of the Republic continued to set terms and preconditions.
On the eve of the submission of the UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council, Mr. Anastasiades raised the issue of decentralized federation. This is a reheated food, given that he did the same at the session of the National Council in 2010. He was then asked by former President D. Christofias to clarify what powers he wanted to be transferred to the constituent states, but he never made it clear. Now, after two sessions of the National Council, a public debate and a public Proclamation by the President himself, he continues to not clarify what he means. This issue is not included within the Framework of the Secretary General of the UN for the simple reason that it is solved, given that the federal competences are essentially agreed. So on the one hand Mr. Anastasiades declares his readiness to continue the talks from the point where they had remained at Crans Montana and on the other hand he re-opens an issue that has been agreed.
The issue is not decentralized federation by itself. In the modern world both decentralized and centralized federations exist. These depend on the reasons and ways of establishing a federation.
However, is perhaps bicommunal bizonal federation with political equality and residual power belonging to the constituent states centralized federation?
What purpose is served by eliminating an existing convergence while attempting to resume the negotiation procedure?
Why, is the President stubbornly insisting on not sharing any of his thoughts with us?
The President must do so because there are competences that if they were to be transferred to the constituent states then we will not be talking about federation, but about confederation or to say the least with strong confederal elements (for example, defence and defense policy, single economy, EEZ, immigration).
Why didn’t the President leave the issue to be discussed in the negotiations, given that the Guterres Framework provides for this, with the possibility of even being able to exchange it with something else? Besides, even if he reached an agreement on this issue the six chapters of the Guterres Framework would have remained open.
The essence is that the President is opening an agreed issue without even specifying or knowing what it is precisely.
One could naturally wonder, what is the purpose of this move?
Is he perhaps trying to avoid the negotiation procedure?
Does he want to lead developments elsewhere as regards the goal of bi-communal, bizonal federation?
It doesn’t escape our attention that many forces and circles are claiming that Mr. Anastasiades has confided in them that he is seeking another solution: a solution with confederal and two-state elements.
Today we have before us the tangible result of all these inconsistent handlings. Things have become much more complex and demanding. The terms of reference must now be agreed for the resumption of the negotiation procedure. While we had a clear framework before us in relation to both the content and the procedure, we are now working out the terms of reference.
What is the reason for this new terminology?
From Crans Montana onwards, many developments have mediated: the withdrawal of the Anastasiades proposals, the subsequent withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot map (on the territorial issue), disagreements as to whether the Guterres Framework is that of 30th June (as the Secretary General and the Turkish Cypriot side consider) or the 4th July, the President’s intention to withdraw the convergence for a Turkish Cypriot vote in the Ministerial Council except on issues of vital importance, on which in fact don’t include natural gas and, of course, the proposal for decentralized federation.
From the moment the Turkish Cypriot side – despite the reservations it expressed – discusses it (the Framework) it was natural for the Secretary General not to reject it, but to ask for joint ways to incorporate it into the terms of reference. He stresses, however, how urgent the issue is. It is all this which probably have to be clarified with regards the terms of reference, as well as the procedure to be followed. However, what is certain is that the Secretary General wants to be convinced that the procedure will be meaningful, otherwise the danger looms that he will not consent to its resumption.
Until now, the UN Secretary General was asking for the talks to continue from where they had left off and be based on his Framework. Now with the terms of reference something more is being asked. Namely, that we should agree that we have the same perception about the convergences that have been agreed; that we have the same interpretation about the points of the Secretary-General’s Framework; that we have the same perception regarding whatever new ideas. Apart from all this, that we should also agree that we have the same end goal, as well as agreeing on how we shall get there.
Therefore, developments are now more than critical. If we do not work methodically, with consistency, sincerity, and commitment to the agreed solution without any footnotes and asterisks that overturn it, then there is a risk that we will not even reach the terms of reference. This will pose enormous dangers for our country, especially if responsibilities are apportioned on us as well for the break down.
The crucial point now is to take advantage of the few weeks we have to agree on the terms of reference.
Does Mr. Anastasiades realize that if this is not attained, there is a danger of responsibilities being apportioned on our side as well?
Does Mr. Anastasiades realize that final partition will be closer than ever before?
AKEL as a patriotic force will never compromise with partition, which was the vision and the constant goal of Rauf Denktash.
AKEL will continue to struggle with all its strength for liberation and reunification, the only possible solution to be achieved is bicommunal bizonal federation; a solution based on the principles of International Law and the UN Charter, on the principles upon which the European Union is founded on.
Those forces and circles possibly turning towards other directions must measure whether they can see them approved by the people without AKEL.
