Intervention of Toumazos Tsielepis, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of AKEL and International Law expert, at the Hearing “The Cyprus problem: recent developments and the way ahead” organized by the AKEL Delegation in the European Parliament and GUE/NGL
“The path towards reconciliation or to a deadlock”
Wednesday, 1st March 2017, European Parliament, Brussels
Dear friends,
I would also like on my part to welcome you all to today’s event. The title of my speech is not accidental. From what comrade Andros has already said, it is clearly apparent that we are nearing the end of a long negotiation procedure which will result in either a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem or in another deadlock in the efforts over half a century now for a solution to the Cyprus problem.
So where are we at this precise moment? A lot of ground has been covered in recent years, and particularly since the beginning of the current effort, that is since 2008, when comrade Demetris Christofias was elected to the presidency of the Republic. I will not tire you with the history of this difficult and thorny path, given that comrade Andros has done so previously. The bottom line is that today some core issues in all chapters of the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem are pending, while the crucial issue of security and guarantees will be discussed further in the Conference on Cyprus which is already underway.
Throughout the previous period the Greek Cypriot side was seeking a solution or at least to get within range of a convergence on all the chapters of the internal aspect and leave for the end the chapter on security to be discussed at a representative international conference. The Turkish Cypriot side was leaving for the end the chapter on the territorial issue as well. The recent statement by the Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci that they would leave for a final phase the territorial issue and subsequently the issue of security is characteristic only that this end was never approaching.
Something therefore had to change and indeed did change. As Andros explained too, things have not evolved as one or the other side wanted. While there are still pending issues in all the chapters, the territorial issue today and for the first time is being discussed not in general and vaguely, but with maps, even though they are locked somewhere in the UN offices in Geneva. And most importantly, for the first time the issue of security is being discussed in the presence of the guarantor powers.
However, the negotiation procedure is now blocked. It is obvious that both sides’ tactic to leave important issues for the end, doesn’t permit further substantive progress to be recorded, indispensable for the uninterrupted continuation and successful outcome of the conference. I will not dwell in detail on this issue, since Andros explained it.
The important thing is that both sides realize that the end is right now and it makes no sense to postpone the discussion of key issues. On the contrary it is extremely likely that the postponement won’t bring the desired end result, since the time available is running out dangerously and that the collapse of the procedure will probably get ahead us or, at best, the procedure will be hooked up to a respirator on a lifeline.
That’s the reason why Andros talked about a discussion not all about the unresolved issues at this phase, but about a targeted negotiation of the key outstanding issues. That is executive power, the effective participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the federal bodies and decisions, the territorial and property issue, Turkey’s novel position for the four freedoms for its citizens. These are the issues that must be the subject of negotiation as a package, based on the principle that none of these will be considered as a convergence unless all are agreed. However, let’s take things in order.
Executive power: Andros has already mentioned that the Christofias – Talat convergence for a rotating presidency with cross and weighted voting must be respected. More specifically, all the citizens of the federal Republic, regardless of community origin, will be able to assert the presidency of the state provided that they meet the criteria of the law. Everyone will be obliged to vote for a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot. Since the Turkish Cypriots will be approximately 20% of the electorate, there must be a weighting of all the Greek Cypriot votes for the Turkish Cypriots candidates to 20% of all the Turkish Cypriot votes. To put it simply, the principle of the equal influence of one community in the election of a candidate from the other community must be applied. The two will rotate the presidency in the same term of office, with double the Greek Cypriot term of office, while the decisions will be taken by the Ministerial Council and not by the President. There are numerous advantages of cross-voting, which will be implemented for the first time in our history and have already been explained by Andros.
Effective participation in federal bodies and decisions: For the basic bodies (executive, legislative and judicial power and a number of other important institutions, such as the regulatory and quasi-judicial bodies) a convergence already exists. A convergence also exists regarding the bodies that will not be collective, as well as in relation to the bodies where there is equal representation. Where there will be a president or director of a body (with the ratio 2: 1) he/she will decide himself/herself. There won’t be a problem either where there is a Council with equal participation. The problem lies in secondary organs where there will be a Council without equal representation (1/3 Turkish participation). Here the Turkish Cypriot side has submitted an unreasonable demand, namely that in all these bodies without exception at least one Turkish Cypriot vote should be demanded for a decision to be taken. However never before has such a proposal been submitted in the long negotiations of the Cyprus problem. The participation ratio of 1/3 is in itself effective and to introduce such dysfunctional arrangements in all the secondary bodies of a technical rather than political character is completely unnecessary. Our own conclusion is that in Mont Peleran we got within range of a convergence, but now we conclude that the Turkish side has retracted.
Territorial issue: If the Greek Cypriot side reconfirms the convergence for the rotating presidency and if the Turkish Cypriot side comes back to the common understanding with regards the effective participation, the vast and very complex chapter of Governance essentially closes definitely. The long-standing position of the Turkish Cypriot side that if the chapter of Governance and particularly the two above issues are closed, it will show flexibility on the rest of the issues. If this commitment is met, it can positively affect the further convergence on the territorial issue, where we are already within range of an agreement on the percentage of territory of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.
Property issue: There is no doubt that if the territorial issue is agreed, the appropriate conditions are created for a successful outcome on two-three issues of the property issue that are still pending.
Four freedoms for Turkish citizens: The issue was raised by the Turkish side during the Christofias – Talat negotiations. It was then that the Turkish Cypriot side had demanded equal treatment of Greek and Turkish citizens on the island. It is worth clarifying that the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of 1960 contains a provision according to which the naturalization of Greek and Turkish citizens in Cyprus, namely the granting of citizenship, will be done based on the ratio of 4: 1. The reason for introducing this provision was to ensure the legitimate concern that none of the two communities would not have the possibility to change the demographic structure in favor of it. Then, of course, the four freedoms of the European Union didn’t exist (free movement of goods, capital, services and persons).
The three of the four freedoms can be agreed on the basis of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement. The free movement of capital is permitted even for third countries too. The free movement of services is not prohibited, but it has practical difficulties which are overcome through various ways. As far as the restrictions on the free movement of goods is concerned, they have to with agricultural rather than manufactured products. The common denominator can easily or with difficulty be found on three of the four freedoms.
The Greek Cypriot side’s principal concern has to do mainly with the free movement of persons, which also includes the staying of working people or businesses. We have at a distance of just a few dozen kilometers a Turkey with a population of 80 million. Cyprus for them is very close, familiar and an attractive destination. Consequently, the population ratio of 4: 1 in the granting of citizenship had to be extended to cover the right of staying as well. This is the essence of the Christofias – Talat convergence and to prove my point I refer you to the document of the United Nations Secretary-General’s former Special Adviser on Cyprus Alexander Downer “convergences 2008-2012”. As for the other freedoms, the convergence naturally provides for a consultation with the European Union.
Unfortunately, Turkey’s new demand for an absolute equation of the rights of Greek and Turkish citizens on the island essentially rejects the aforementioned convergence and ignores the fact that Greece is a member of the EU, while Turkey is not. If Turkey insists on this absurd illogical demand, I can’t see a possibility of reaching a conclusion on this specific issue. For the sake of justice, I must mention, without of course going into details that in Mont Peleran 3 a relevant discussion took place in which I formed the impression that a conclusion on the issue of the four freedoms for Turkish citizens was feasible. However, on returning to Cyprus I found that the Turkish side had retracted. If the Turkish Cypriot side finds a way to move on the basis of the discussion in Mont Peleran, we can hope.
Security and guarantees. This is the most crucial chapter and the sole subject of the Conference for Cyprus which is under way.
Among the network of international treaties which accompanied the emergence of our newly-established state in 1960, the Treaty of Guarantee held a prominent place. Such Treaties, which were imposed on several new states during the process of decolonization, are questionable from the standpoint of modern International Law, it is one-sided and their legitimacy is justifiably disputed by prominent International Law experts.
The Treaty of Guarantee merely confirms this rule: It was imposed with the threat of force, its content violates basic principles and peremptory rules of International Law, it is one-sided, while it was violated by all three guarantor powers in a way that destroys its purpose and subject.
Although the Treaty guarantees the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus, the military Junta of Athens executed the coup d’état of 15th July 1974, Turkey on the pretext precisely of the coup invaded the island on 20th July of the same year and 43 years onwards it is still occupying militarily 40% of the territories of the Republic of Cyprus, while Britain did absolutely nothing to stop the above.
At this point I want to stress that the Treaty of Guarantee does not provide for a right of military intervention. However even if it did, as Turkey interprets it in bad faith, this would be contrary to the United Nations Charter, whose Article 53 prohibits such actions except upon the authorization of the UN Security Council. It is known that in the event of conflict of an international treaty with the Charter, the Charter takes precedence.
We, therefore, have a sound legal basis to question the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee, but this Treaty is still valid and the overall issue is its abolition through negotiation. Another way of safeguarding the security of both communities must be found that will correspond to today’s conditions.
AKEL doesn’t have illusions, nor is it blind. We recognize that both communities have genuine and grave concerns about their security within the framework of the solution of the Cyprus problem – not only the Greek Cypriots, but the Turkish Cypriots too. The Greek Cypriots fear Turkey, while the Turkish Cypriots fear the Greek Cypriots. It makes no sense to analyze who is to blame more and who less, who is right to be afraid and who is not. What is important is that both of them feel that they are at risk if the sought solution does not meet their concerns on security issues; concerns that have not appeared out of nowhere, but have to do with modern Cypriot history.
Consequently, given that both communities have concerns about their security, and indeed different concerns, it is clear that to be able to reach a mutually acceptable settlement it is not possible for the concerns of one community to be met at the expense of the other community’s concerns. The Greek Cypriot’s concerns have to do with the guarantees, the rights of intervention and the presence of the Turkish troops on the island. Therefore, if the Turkish Cypriot side insists on such arrangements to safeguard its own security, this is a recipe for a deadlock. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot side should not be content by stating just what it rejects, but should be ready to discuss alternative ways for safeguarding the security of the Turkish Cypriot community as well.
Until recently Turkey insisted on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and wouldn’t discuss anything else. Now it has somewhat varied its stance. We want to interpret this as an intent to negotiate the issue. However, the new Turkish position for a guarantee only of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state and for a right of intervention on the invitation of the latter cannot be accepted under any circumstances.
On the contrary, we believe that President Anastasiades’ proposal for a police force under the umbrella of the United Nations, which in the event of intercommunal clashes will intervene after having previously exhausted all its internal means, constitutes a good basis in the pursuit of a mutually acceptable arrangement.
During the last session of the conference on Cyprus in Mont Peleran at a technocratic level with the purpose of making a better preparation for the further discussion at a political level, the two sides expressed their concerns on security, raised and answered relevant questions and proposed tools for addressing the issue. At this point we concluded that all the Turkish Cypriot side’s concerns without exception refer exclusively to the implementation and not to the content of the solution.
Besides how could there have been concerns about the content of a solution which, according to the convergences agreed so far, will prohibit enosis, partition or secession, establish an indestructible federal bond, ensure the political equality of the two communities, including effective participation in the federal bodies and decisions, prohibit the usurping of the competences of the constituent states, exclude the jurisdiction of the power of one community over the other, include effective mechanisms for the solution of deadlocks without ever violating the principle of the political equality of the two communities and so many others?
The Turkish Cypriot community’s concerns are centred on what will happen if the solution is violated, if the Greek Cypriots usurp power, if the Turkish Cypriots will be expelled from the administration of the state and find themselves in a vacuum. With so many safeguard arrangements that I have listed so indicatively and not exhaustively this cannot happen except in a manifestly illegal way.
Given however that these are the Turkish Cypriot community’s concerns, an additional step could be made. In such a case, as naturally in the event of secession too, which is the concern of the Greek Cypriots, there could be an agreement for the establishment of an effective mechanism that would prevent both the usurpation of the state and secession. For example, there could be an independent body formed which, in such extreme and remote cases, would determine what exactly would have happened.
Furthermore preventative sanctions should be imposed on the side that will try either one or the other. Both the UN Security Council and the European Union itself could get involved in this mechanism. I won’t of course go into details, but the concerns of both communities are allayed within this framework.
Dear friends,
The efforts for a solution of the Cyprus problem over many years have now entered the final stage, where advanced convergences have been registered on the chapter of the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem, for the first time we have maps on the territorial issue and Turkey is at the table to discuss the security issue.
It really would be a shame if the engagement that exists right now leads to the collapse of the negotiation procedure. It is imperative that a way is found to continue the effort and the best way is the one analyzed by Andros and as I subsequently explained it in a more detailed way. It is the path to reconciliation and a comprehensive settlement.
The other path is that of deadlock and the collapse of the negotiation procedure. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot side on the one hand is hesitating to call for a discussion of core outstanding issues as a package, leaving executive power for the end, while the Turkish Cypriot side on the other hand demands a selective prioritized discussion only with regards the issues that interest it, namely rotating presidency and effective participation in all the bodies and decisions at a federal level. Given these facts, the complication persists.
Regardless of the critical situation that has been created recently, AKEL is determined to exhaust all possibilities for a solution of the Cyprus problem, always on the basis of principles and the agreed framework, because as we have proclaimed repeatedly, for us what is important are the future generations and not the next elections.
