Interview with Toumazos Tsielepis, International Law expert, Head of the Cyprus Problem Office of the C.C, and member of the Political Bureau of AKEL
17-18/05/2015 “HARAVGI” daily newspaper
With the assumption by Mr. Akinci of the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community the hope for a solution to the Cyprus problem has been rekindled. What are the elements that alter the current juncture in comparison to others of the recent past?
The current juncture of the Cyprus problem is highlighted by the fact that we have a new Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Akinci, who has always had a consistent position in favour of a solution of the Cyprus problem based on a bi-zonal bi-communal federal solution and of course this is something that cannot be ignored. I say this because there is a widely held perception that regardless of who the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community might be nothing can be done since it is Turkey that decides everything. This is an absolute position. For sure Turkey has the decisive say since it is the force that maintains occupation forces on the island and it is the one that can and must withdraw them. However, Turkey cannot ignore the fact that the respective Turkish Cypriot leader plays his own role, particularly with regards the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem. The coincidence is that although we had a Turkish Cypriot leader who did not want a solution, we now have a Turkish Cypriot leader who is seeking a solution.
Furthermore, one cannot but take into account that the solution is in Turkey’s well-intentioned interests, given that the latter wants to have an advanced relation as possible with the European Union and possibly full EU membership. It has not abandoned this goal and knows that the Cyprus problem is an obstacle. There is also the issue of the hydrocarbons. Turkey knows that the only peaceful way for the Turkish Cypriots to benefit, but also indirectly Turkey itself from the same natural gas, is through the solution of the Cyprus problem
Deep down everyone recognizes that Akinci is not the same as Eroglu, but on the other they are worried that he will not stand up to Ankara so as to break free from Turkey. What do you think?
Akinci is a leader who wants a solution. Our task is to assess him at the negotiating table. That is where the moment of truth is, where everything will be judged. There is a window of opportunity. Whether this can lead to a solution will be judged at the negotiating table. We will assume our own share of responsibility. We must try. It’s not correct to state that nothing can be done, because this inevitably leads to abandoning the effort to solve the Cyprus problem through talks.
Do you consider the basis on which the talks will resume as good?
The basis of the negotiations is defined long ago. This basis is none another than the basic principles of International Law, the relevant UN resolutions on the Cyprus problem, and of course the agreed framework of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution with political equality, with a single sovereignty, a single international personality and a single citizenship. The difference of Mr. Akinci with Mr. Eroglu is that the former demonstrates a willingness to negotiate within the agreed framework, something Mr. Eroglu did so only verbally. Consequently, the basis of the negotiations does exist and it is a good basis. It is an internal compromise which maintains the single sovereignty, single citizenship and the single international personality.
If the Christofias-Talat convergences are adopted can we record progress in the near future? If not, what will the consequences be?
Our position from the outset was that the negotiation should not have started from scratch. That was our big difference with Mr.Eroglou during the Demetris Christofias administration. With Mr. Talat we had reached an advanced stage and within range of agreement on three chapters (Governance and power-sharing, Economy, EU Affairs), but two chapters depended to a large extent on Turkey itself (Security and Guarantees and the Territorial issue) which the Turkish Cypriot side on the one hand discussed, but not in any detail.
How the negotiations will begin is crucial. If the convergences are automatically taken into account then a big part of the road will have been covered. If the talks start from scratch, then the procedure will be lengthy with extremely doubtful results.
Officially it is said that the talks will start from where they left off in September 2014. Is this how you understand it?
Perhaps they mean that they will continue procedurally from where they left off, because what in reality has been achieved is the Joint Declaration of 11th February 2014 and nothing else. Apart from that, what else has been achieved? Does everything begin on the basis that we have a joint declaration or that everything that was achieved previously is taken into account? I repeat that if we all see things with a clear mind and not through the lens of petty-political maneuvering and petty expediencies, then we can move ahead. All the talk/propaganda about supposed “unacceptable concessions” and “generous offers” during the Christofias administration did not correspond to reality. The UN Secretary-General Advisor’s document on convergences was made public and despite its inaccuracies, reflects in an objective way what had been achieved. There is nothing in the document that can be considered as an unacceptable concession. On the contrary, the document confirms that we are on the correct path.
On the other hand, there is already talk about an interim agreement to “lock” certain issues.
Such discussions also took place in the past. For example, in 2010 it was said that if the convergences are recorded this would constitute an interim agreement. The interim agreement is something very different, as in the case of Ireland: you conclude an incomplete agreement, you begin to apply it and you gradually agree on other aspects and supplement them to the agreement. In our case the convergences existed. As far as the content is concerned, they are binding, but not regarding the legal effect as well. Since we haven’t concluded the process, these convergences have not attained the status of a legal agreement; and this is the true meaning of the principle that nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed. For that reason, there is no possibility of an interim agreement. The goal is the overall solution of the Cyprus problem.
How do you respond to fears that have revived about a solution that would not safeguard human rights and basic freedoms?
This cannot be done simply because a solution must not be signed that will not ensure them. The opinion that the very form of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution will not safeguard human rights is based on Turkish interpretations given by Eroglu and Denktash. Such interpretations are not accepted by our side, nor by the UN resolutions. Indeed, if one were to refer to the convergences registered during 2008-2012 you will find a very important convergence, confirming all that I have said: That is to say, there will be no restriction whatsoever in the exercise of the fundamental freedoms – freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and freedom to own property – after a logical transition period. From there on, there are no restrictions. This was achieved for the first time and was made possible because the convergence responded to the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot side: That is to say, how the Turkish Cypriots will administer if the Greek Cypriots become the majority in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state? Then, we had submitted a proposal that stated that if at some time the Greek Cypriots exceeded a certain percentage that would be agreed, those that would subsequently exceed it would vote on a communal rather than on a territorial basis. It was a fair compromise because it met the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots for bi-zonality and the concerns of Greek Cypriots that everyone can exercise without any restrictions the fundamental freedoms. This negates the concerns that bi-zonality is racist, leads to guaranteed majorities etc, provided of course that this convergence is respected.
What should the President of the Republic be aware of at this critical juncture for the Cyprus problem, so that this light of hope is translated into progress for a solution?
There is a conjuncture and the duty of the President and the political leadership in general, is to utilize it. The next conjuncture may come back, but the passage of time creates condition which are not favourable. What we want to achieve as Greek Cypriots is being eroded over time (territory, properties, the withdrawal of settlers and other related issues). We therefore need to assume our share of responsibility. It is not enormous, but we have to assume this share of responsibility.
We should go into the negotiations with confidence. We should not be overcome by syndromes of fear. If you know what you want, if you know how to support and substantiate it, if you have the good will to meet the well-intentioned concerns of the other side and do not believe you can reach a better solution than 1960 and with International Law as your given weapon, then there is no reason for concern. This is what the President must do, this is how he must press ahead and utilize what has been achieved with great efforts so far.
Bearing all this in mind, is the conclusion of the negotiations and the achievement of a solution feasible in 2015?
I do not know if the solution is feasible. However I do know there’s a good possibility to resolve the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem. From there on, it will depend on Turkey’s stand. If we manage to solve the internal aspects and arrive within range of an agreement on these aspects – I am sure that this is what Akinci is seeking – then the pressure on Turkey will be greater than it is today for Turkey to also assume its own huge share of responsibility. I am referring to the issues of security, guarantees and the settlers.
Are the “easy” Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) a good start, or are we wasting time and must we get into the substance of the Cyprus problem immediately?
I think it’s a good start in the following sense: We must certainly proceed to the substance of the Cyprus problem and not waste time because in the past there have been cases where the search of some grandiose CBM’s eventually led to the sidelining of the substance of the Cyprus problem, restricting the discussion to CBM’s and as usual it did not lead anywhere. CBM’s are necessary because they create a more suitable atmosphere for conducting meaningful negotiations. This is the reason why simultaneously with the discussion of the substance of the Cyprus problem CBM’s must also be implemented that can be easily applied and not CBM’s that would probably be discussed for years and will not lead anywhere.
The return of Famagusta every so often is discussed in public within the Greek Cypriot community, despite the fact that on this issue not a step forward was made, not even with the help of US Vice-President Joe Biden as well. What is the situation?
It is known that the issue of Famagusta has been raised since the time of Resolution 550 approved by the United Nations Security Council on the logic that Famagusta should be returned, regardless of the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. All attempts on the issue since then have failed.
Mr. Akinci was the first Turkish Cypriot leader who before assuming the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community declared that he is ready to discuss the issue of the return of Famagusta and he should be given credit for that.
The problem focuses on the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side considers Famagusta part of a package that also includes the airport of Tymbou, which is an extremely difficult issue. If we take the worst case scenario, the Turkish Cypriots at this precise moment appear to have the characteristics of statehood, but I stress illegally. That is to say, the territory, the so-called “people” and administration. Apart from legality what else do they need? The relationship with the outside world is essential, which is not guaranteed as much through the port, as through the airport. If they attain this as well without the prospect of solution on the horizon, then one cannot exclude the possibility of them thinking, why should they want a solution anymore? They may think as follows: “Let’s not have our flag at the United Nations and the EU, but in return we will not give back an inch of land, we will not return a single property, nor will the settlers leave.” Might not they think along this lines? This is the political difficulty, which is bypassed only if we come within range of a solution.
There is also a great legal difficulty: The airport must be registered in a state and the question is where it will be registered. If it is registered in the Republic of Cyprus, the problems, in terms of international aviation law, can easily be overcome. However this is not accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side, as our side cannot accept the airport being registered in the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus TRNC” because this would be tantamount to its de jure recognition. Therefore it must be registered in some third state. In the past, the efforts led to it being registering in Turkey (when Nicosia airport was being discussed in 1993-94). However, it was concluded in the course of events that if it is registered in a third country then it will face great difficulties with direct flights. It is a freedom that is not easily granted by third countries without restrictions regarding passengers and cargo. This is known as the fifth freedom of the air. And we could find ourselves confronted with the following grotesque situation: we agree on the one hand on direct flights, but they may only take place to only those member states that would accept it, otherwise again via Turkey. Back then, when they saw the deadlocks, the idea had been put forth for an airline to be registered at the UN. But in the course of events they realized that third states would wonder what kind of airline is this one of the UN. That is to say, the problem could not be bypassed and subsequently all the attempts failed.
My question is: Is it logical to enter into such an adventure now when before us we have a chance to try to achieve a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem, which would resolve these problems once and for all?
When Turkey conveys a message that it wants a solution, we urge her to demonstrate its will at the negotiating table. What in your view would constitute the first concrete example of intent for the Greek Cypriot side?
Turkey has lowered the tones, but will be assessed at the hour of judgement that will come at a subsequent moment. I am sure Mustafa Akinci will try to promote those issues that depend on him, namely the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem. Given that we arrived within range of an agreement on these issues, the core issues will follow afterwards. Namely, security, guarantees, troops, settlers, which on the one hand are very difficult political decisions, but technically very complex issues. They are very difficult political decisions which however can be taken in a single day. When we arrive at that point, it is at that moment that Turkey will be put before its responsibilities.
Turkey appears to be insisting on guarantees.
The issue of guarantees can be definitively resolved only with the participation of the guarantor powers because there are contractual commitments. There is the Treaty of Guarantee, which violates fundamental principles of International Law, but it is there and it is in force and valid. Therefore, the issue can be solved once and for all and irreversibly only when we have come to within range of an agreement on the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem and proceed to discuss these issues, probably through the convening of a multilateral, international conference.
Right now we must focus on the issues that will be on the table, the basic issues of the Cyprus problem, that is to say the so-called core issues.
Of course our position is that the guarantees are unnecessary and must be abolished. For us it is unthinkable – it is a “red line” – that Turkey has the right to armed intervention, but these issues will be finally resolved in due time, when the ball will be at the feet of Turkey. Consequently, let us try to reach agreement where we can with Akinci and put Ankara before its responsibilities.
Accession to NATO is a red line
If at the last moment for an agreement to be concluded Cyprus’ accession to NATO as a compromise on issues relating to security and guarantees is put on the table of the negotiations, how will AKEL react?
The question of NATO is being raised only in the discussions between the political forces. Nobody has ever raised such issue before us, not even NATO itself, nor do the respective plans and ideas of the United Nations put forth such an issue before us. The answer is simple and is addressed to numerous recipients: If such a parameter of a solution does exist, they should count the numbers to see if these are sufficient to approve the solution in a referendum, because AKEL won’t be among these numbers. Not even the excuse is put forth that NATO raises such an issue or that “they are exerting pressure on us and what can we do” … The issue is predominantly internal. Those who raise this issue, if they think they can pass the solution in a referendum without AKEL, let them do so.
The same also goes for the issue of demilitarization: They should not count on AKEL’s support if they intend to have an army in Cyprus that will participate in supposedly EU operations, something which the EU does not ask from us. We are the only ones raising such an issue.
