Speech by the General Secretary of AKEL, Andros Kyprianou at the meeting with the Ambassadors on recent developments in the efforts to reach a solution to the Cyprus problem and the way ahead
15th February 2017, Nicosia
Permit me to welcome you all to our meeting today. I thank you because you have once again honored us with your presence.
We felt the need to convey to you our positions and thoughts on the Cyprus problem because we believe the negotiating procedure is at a critical juncture. We do so because we feel that this two-way communication that we have established between us for some years is important for us, but for you too. At the same time we consider that where the ongoing procedure is heading will soon be clarified, namely whether it will lead to an agreement or whether it will too end in failure with all that this entails. I point this out because, without constituting timeframes the upcoming Presidential elections will influence the discussions.
In stating the above I do not mean that this is the last chance for a solution of the Cyprus problem. There will always be a next opportunity if the necessary political will exists on the part of all involved parties. However, the aimless passage of time erodes our objectives, particularly with regards the chapters on property, demographic structure and by extension the territorial issue too.
Our own desire, our own aspiration and the reason why we as AKEL are struggling is that this procedure under way arrives at a positive result. By a positive result we mean in the sense that a solution will be achieved based on principles and the agreed framework; a solution that will create the prospects for a lasting and viable peace on our island; a solution that will ensure security and stability for all Cypriots, so that together we can build a future in conditions of progress and prosperity for all of us. This has been our vision for decades regarding the Cyprus problem.
As I said previously, we are going through a critical and decisive phase of the Cyprus problem. What deepens the concern of public opinion is the conflicting and contradictory messages it is receiving from political parties and figures. We therefore want to present our own positions and thoughts to you.
It was always the long-standing position of AKEL and the Greek Cypriot side in general that we must first agree or, at least, get within a range of an agreement on all the chapters of the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem (Governance and power sharing, economy, European Union issues, Property and Territory) and that a representative international conference should subsequently be convened for a solution of the chapter on Security and Guarantees. The Turkish Cypriot side’s position was that the above chapters of the internal aspect, except the territorial issue, must be agreed and that we should then enter into a final stage with the negotiation of the territorial issue and subsequently of the security issue in a four or five-party conference.
Things did not evolve exactly as either one or the other side wanted. On three of the five chapters of the internal aspect (Governance and power sharing, economy, European Union) significant progress had been recorded during the Christofias – Talat talks. It would not be an exaggeration to say that these three chapters were since then within range of a convergence. I particularly point out the progress registered on the chapter of Governance, which is extremely complex and composed of nearly twenty sub-chapters. It was a significant achievement, taking into account the bicommunality, bi-zonality and political equality that demanded delicate balances, as well as the safeguarding of functionality, without simultaneously deviating from the principles of the solution and the aforementioned guidelines.
Conversely, satisfactory progress was not achieved on the chapter of property, while there was limited discussion on the territorial issue. There are reasons for the difficulty on these chapters. The property issue has to do with the individual right of property of tens of thousands of our compatriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. More than forty years later, the situation on this specific issue has been complicated tremendously. It has become even more complicated with the Dimopoulos and Meleargos judgement of the European Court of Human Rights which, I regretfully note, were most probably taken according to political rather than law criteria. The Turkish Cypriot side’s persistent refusal to negotiate the property issue in connection with the territorial issue, made progress on both of these chapters even more difficult.
The assumption of the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot side by Dervis Eroglu, in 2010, brought about a setback in the negotiations given that he went back on the basic convergences that existed previously. Mustafa Akinci accepted the Christofias – Talat convergences, a fact which helped President Anastasiades accept them too. The result was a change in the negative atmosphere and further progress began to be recorded.
In the almost two years of talks between the two leaders steps forward have been made. However disagreements still exist on key issues. This is also attributable to both side’s regressions regarding the convergences that had been agreed between Christofias and Talat. At some stage and while there were no objective conditions, in our view, the decision was taken to continue the discussion abroad. The ultimate goal was the convening of a Conference on Security issues, even if there significant pending issues remained on core issues.
During the first meeting in Mont Peleran it was agreed to devote three days to the discussion of outstanding issues on the internal aspects and two days to discuss the territorial issue. Furthermore it was agreed that there would have to be a range of convergence on criteria existing before Maps would be submitted. Indeed, during the first three days further progress was achieved on some outstanding issues. So at last the discussion of the territorial issue also began. In the course of events it was apparent that a range of convergence was achieved on the ostensibly most important criterion, namely the percentage of territory that will remain under Turkish Cypriot administration after the solution of the Cyprus solution (28.2% according to the Greek Cypriot side, 29.2% to the Turkish Cypriot side). It was also apparent that room for convergence existed with regards the second criterion too, namely the percentage of coastline under Turkish Cypriot administration. However there still exits a significant difference with regards the third criterion, namely the return of territories to how many Greek Cypriots will potentially return to their properties under Greek Cypriot administration. I clarify that this third criterion in reality also concerns territory, given that regions to be returned are highlighted. Somewhere at this stage the negotiations were interrupted, with an agreement to continue them one week later, again at Mont Peleran.
The interruption of the procedure had negative consequences. The momentum was lost, while it was now clear that the prospects were not the best in view of the continuation. AKEL did everything it could for the effort to continue keeping hope alive. We proposed to the two leaders not to insist on a range of convergence on the third criterion as well, but that they should submit and discuss Maps. We were not heeded and Mont Peleran 2 ended without a result.
The view that we conveyed to Mr. Anastasiades was that an effort should have been made, without concessions on principles, to resume the negotiation. We had warned that a potential prolonged stalemate harbored serious dangers for the future of the negotiation procedure. One danger that existed, was the well-known threat issued by Erdogan that if there was no progress by the end of 2016, he would insist on the “naturalization” of a large number of settlers. Such an action would have represented a blow to the talks, since it would negate the very significant convergence on the demographic ratio at the time of the solution. The President of the Republic evaluating the given situation took his decisions which he discussed with Mr. Akinci. They decided to continue the effort to achieve convergences in Cyprus and for a Conference on Cyprus to follow in Geneva. The internal aspects would be discussed there, they would continue with the submission of Maps and conclude with the Conference on Security.
For AKEL the procedure that was agreed was not the appropriate one because that we assessed that it would not yield the expected results. We also strongly believed that every time expectations are raised among the people and the effort fails the people are left disappointed. If this happens repeatedly it provokes serious problems among public opinion. We still believe that the best procedure would have been first to get within range of an agreement on all the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem, including the territorial issue, and to subsequently convene a representative international conference on Security with the participation of the Republic of Cyprus, the two communities, the guarantor powers, the other permanent UN Security Council members and the European Union. Regarding the Security issues we considered that a preparation could have been made and the International Conference to be convened at the very last stage. However, given that the two leaders agreed the specific procedure and measuring the potential problems that would arise if we had rejected it, as a responsible and serious party we decided to back it. Our goal was and remains the achievement of a solution of the Cyprus problem; a just, under the circumstances, functional solution so as to be viable.
Both during the talks in Cyprus, as well as during the negotiation of outstanding issues on the internal aspect in Geneva, a little further progress was achieved. Hence, we reached the stage of the submission of a Map by both sides. The Maps that were submitted meet the agreed criterion of the territorial percentage under the administration of each community but, as expected, from there onwards each side submitted the best Map for its own community. Therefore, there is still a distance on the rest of criteria, but the fact that we will now have a discussion of the territorial issue on the specific maps rather than generally and vaguely is important.
The Conference on Cyprus followed, which as expected did not lead to a solution of the chapter on Security and the Guarantees, not even to the start of a substantive discussion on the issue. This was a first discussion and the Conference must certainly continue. In Geneva the conditions for tangible progress on this specific chapter were not ripe. To better prepare the ground it was decided to continue the Conference at a technocratic level. In the Conference, which was again held in Mont Peleran, both sides presented their concerns on the specific matter, relevant questions were submitted and answered and the means that each side deems necessary to address the issue were defined. Our evaluation is that at this level everything possible was done to prepare the continuation of the Conference at a political level, something which will be done in the second half of next month.
Taking into account the current situation as I have roughly outlined it above, the question arises as to what should be done from now so that we can reach the sought goal of a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem.
Before I answer the question, I would like to refer to some events that will most certainly affect the ongoing procedure.
First of all, I would like to refer to the Referendum due to be held in Turkey this April regarding the Constitutional amendments. Regardless of the statements being made by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot politicians, it is obvious that this does represent an obstacle to the waging of a substantive discussion on the core issues. Mr. Erdogan even if he wants to will not be making moves that would potentially cause him problems in his effort to secure the required percentage of votes that would permit him to proceed with the constitutional amendments.
On the other hand, the deterioration of the relations between Greece and Turkey as a result of the Turkish provocative behaviour, leaves no room for a substantive discussion between them on the issue of Security. The whole atmosphere is even more burdened by unacceptable statements being made recently by Turkish officials and others. Bearing in mind the above, it is our belief that the time between now until April is not suitable for real progress to be recorded. However what should be done is the necessary preparatory work with the elaboration of alternative proposals which while insisting on the basic principles of the solution, they will create preconditions for convergence.
AKEL assesses that the current negotiation procedure is currently blocked. If specific moves are not undertaken in the immediate period ahead, we fear that the talks might result in a deadlock. The fact that we will enter a pre-election period in the summer cannot also be underestimated, which will inevitably adversely affect the entire effort.
The worrying messages about a possible negative development began in the meetings in Mont Peleran. Although further progress was made there on the outstanding issues and, most importantly, they arrived within range of a convergence with regards the most basic criterion of the territorial issue, namely the percentage of territory under the administration of each constituent state, nevertheless we had a failure. There are several reasons that led to that disappointed development, but the most important reason was the following, in our view, namely the tactic of both sides to leave issues of the internal aspect at the end so as, they believe, to have room to negotiate, leads to deadlock. For example, when the Turkish Cypriot side leaves the territorial issue at the end, the Greek Cypriot side does the same with the issue of executive power, or vice versa. Who started this tactic isn’t important, but where this leads to. It only leads to blockage, having particularly in mind the Turkish stance on security too. Ankara has already stated that it will not say its final word on this issue if it does not previously see how the issues of executive power, the effective participation of the Turkish Cypriot side in federal institutions and decisions, as well as the issue of the four freedoms for Turkish citizens (the latter is a recent demand) will be solved.
Therefore, if the two sides continue this practice, the inevitable result will be all attempts will fail. If something doesn’t change, we fear that the new session of the Conference for Cyprus will also have the fate of the former conference. In this way we will soon arrive at the unsuccessful end of this effort too, with all the resulting negative consequences for the country and our people.
AKEL has a clear view of what needs to be done. The pre-election campaign period may be approaching and perhaps our position might have a cost for us, but for us what takes precedence is the solution the Cyprus problem and not any temporary petty-party gains. As we have repeatedly stated, what we are interested in is the future generations, not the next elections.
At this crucial point it is pointless to discuss all the outstanding issues, which are admittedly quite a few in number. We must in a targeted way and by the next phase of the Conference on Cyprus focus on some key issues, the resolution of which will have a positive effect on the Conference as well. I refer to the issues of executive power, effective participation, the four freedoms, and the territorial and property issue. These above issues must now be discussed together and any convergences on these issues will only apply if they are all resolved. Otherwise the whole exercise should be considered as void and no relative convergence whatsoever will apply.
More specifically, the only core outstanding issues on the Chapter of Governance and Power Sharing is the rotating presidency issue and effective participation. AKEL’s position was and remains that the Christofias – Talat convergence on the issue of executive power must be adopted, namely a rotating Presidency with cross and weighted voting. This proposal obliges the political Parties in both communities to cooperate for the election of the President and Vice President. It transfers whatever confrontation to a political level, as all modern States operate and not to an ethnic level. As far as the issue of effective participation is concerned, if the Turkish Cypriot side respects the outcome of the negotiation in the first Mont Peleran meeting, then we can arrive within range of a convergence. If a convergence is recorded on these two issues, we believe that it opens the way for getting within range of a convergence on the territorial issue as well, something which in turn will assist the solution of the two-three main outstanding issues of the property issue.
The most difficult issue seems to be Turkey’s new demand for the four freedoms. However, if everyone respects the Christofias – Talat convergence on this specific issue, this issue too will be overcome. According to this convergence, which is recorded in the Downer document “Convergences 2008-2012”, namely that one Turkish Cypriot vote will not be required in all the bodies but only in some, the four freedoms for Turkish citizens will be implemented in a way so as the population ratio is not violated. More simply, the burning issue concerns the abode of Turkish citizens on the island. You perhaps know that the Treaty of Establishment contains a provision under which the granting of citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus to Greek and Turkish citizens will be done according to a ratio of 4: 1. Back then, of course, the four freedoms of the European Union didn’t exist while now they do. This made the expansion of this ratio absolutely necessary so as to cover not only the nationality, but also the abode of Turkish citizens on the island. Turkey must respect this important convergence and understand the legitimate concerns of the Greek Cypriots who have opposite them a country with a population of 80 million people.
If the above key issues are not addressed in the way that we propose, we will arrive to the conference with clean hands, in the sense that the only key chapter that will be discussed there is the core issue of security and the guarantees. The remaining outstanding issues, which do not concern core issues, can be resolved easily and quickly before we arrive at the referenda.
Of course we do not harbour the illusion that the solution of the chapter on security is an easy task. However, we believe that the prior resolution of all the other key issues will make it easier to address the matter. As the discussion on a technocratic level revealed in Mont Peleran, both communities have their concerns on this issue. We the Greek Cypriots fear Turkey, while Turkish Cypriots fear us. It is therefore clear that the security of both communities must be ensured. This in turn means that the security of one community cannot be safeguarded at the expense of the other community’s security.
The above mentioned also explains our position that the anachronistic system of guarantees, any rights of intervention and the stationing of Turkish troops on the island cannot be accepted. Such arrangements would cause great uncertainty among Greek Cypriots and will drive them to vote against the proposal in a new referendum. It is therefore necessary to find other ways so that both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots feel secure. We consider that the proposal of President Anastasiades for an international police force with a UN umbrella can constitute the basis for a solution of the specific issue.
From the preparatory discussions at the level of technocrats in Mont Peleran it follows that the Turkish Cypriot side’s concerns have nothing to do with the content of the solution itself, but rather with the possibility of it being violated. Neither could they be related to the content of the solution, given that in the solution many strong safeguards are provided for: bicommunality, bi-zonality, political equality, an indissoluble federal system, the prohibition of any union with another state or secession, effective participation in the bodies and decisions at a federal level, the exclusion of the usurpation of federal competences, the provision that no community will have jurisdiction or authority over the other, and much more.
As you know, in Mont Peleran both sides analyzed their concerns on the issue of security. All the questions of the Turkish Cypriot side without exception are centred on what will happen if the Greek Cypriots violate the agreement and usurp power. They fear that in this case they will again be found stateless while Greek Cypriots will hold the state exclusively in their own hands. Concerns are being expressed by the Greek Cypriots as well about a future secession which this time will lead to either recognition because now the Turkish Cypriot constituent state will exist or even about the usurpation of the Republic by the Turkish Cypriots, because there will be a rotating Presidency. AKEL does not share such fears given that all these will be excluded with the overall settlement.
However, taking into account the fears on both sides we believe that apart from the clear safeguards provided by the solution itself, a system could be the subject of elaboration that would guarantee the imposition of severe and dissuasive sanctions on the side that will violate the agreement. That is, a credible mechanism should be established which in the event of an usurpation of power by the Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots would activate such sanctions so as to prevent any such intention and restore the constitutional order. Similarly, in the event of secession punitive measures would be triggered and they of course would exclude the international recognition of the entity that will secede. In any case the measures will not concern the continuity of the federal state but, on the contrary, will ensure the respect of the international legality and rule of law. We believe that such a mechanism meets the most convincing manner these widely prevalent concerns in both communities.
At this crucial point of the Cypriot problem, AKEL reassures you once again that for us what takes precedence is the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the principles of International Law, the principles upon which the European Union is founded and the agreed framework. As time is dangerously running out, we will exhaust all possibilities to reach the sought goal. In this sincere effort we need your help and support. We ask you to exert your influence on Turkey since it is obvious that at this particular stage we are at, the solution of the internal aspects of the problem will basically depend on solution of the security issue. I do not believe anyone in this room doubts that the key not just of the chapter on security is held by Turkey and nobody else.
The solution of the Cyprus problem serves the well-intentioned interests first and foremost of the Cypriots themselves, but also of Turkey, Greece, the peoples of our turbulent region and the European Union itself. As regards Cyprus in particular, we consider that there will be many benefits generated by the solution for both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins.
The liberation and reunification of the island will create conditions of peace, security and stability. These conditions will encourage investment from abroad, leading to economic development. There will also be a further increase in tourism and the prospect of improvements in other sectors of the economy especially of the construction sector due to the needs that will arise. We shouldn’t forget that with a solution of the Cyprus problem the exploitation of natural gas will also be unimpeded, while new and big prospects for its commercial exploitation will also be created. All this will lead to progress and prosperity for the people as a whole. It would be a real shame at the point we have reached to lose this opportunity too.
