AKEL’s letter to the President of the Republic on Akinci proposal

 

AKEL C.C. Press Office, 20 July 2019, Nicosia

We publish today the letter sent by AKEL to the President of the Republic last Thursday, 18 July 2019, on the Greek Cypriot side’s stand with regards the proposal of Akinci in relation to Natural Gas.

It is well known that AKEL in stating its position on the issue, has expressed the view that the Greek Cypriot side cannot simply reject the proposal, but that it must reply by tabling a counter-proposal.

The views and proposals of AKEL are contained in the letter it has sent.

There follows the letter.

 

“Nicosia, July 18, 2019

Y.E. President of the Republic of Cyprus

Mr. Nikos Anastasiades,

 

I communicate with you with this letter in order to convey to you AKEL’s views in writing on the Akinci proposal on the issue of the hydrocarbons around the island.

As I have already stated at the last meeting of the Council of Political Leaders, AKEL considers that the proposal cannot be accepted, something which is also underlined in the joint communiqué released. From there onwards, however, we need to point out that particularly in today’s extremely adverse conditions, an outright rejection cannot be our final word. The rejection of the proposal must necessarily be accompanied by a counter-proposal of the Greek Cypriot side.

Our unwavering goal and top priority must be the solution of the Cyprus problem within the agreed framework. Since 1974, we have co-decided that the only way to seek a solution of the Cyprus problem is the conduct of substantive negotiations. For that reason, this parameter needs to be taken into account when we take a decision on the issue. It is our belief that the issue of natural gas can and must be used as an incentive for the solution.

Irrespective of the Greek Cypriot side’s well-known views that Turkey is the sole guilty party responsible for the protracted stalemate, the UN Secretary-General unfortunately has a different view, as he expresses it in his Reports that have been submitted after the break down at Crans Montana: He considers that the three guarantor powers (Note: Britain, Turkey and Greece)  had made a positive contribution on the key issue of security and guarantees and that the responsibility for the break down lies with the two leaders.

At the same time, we are concerned about developments within the Turkish Cypriot community. The prolonged deadlock and the situation that has evolved does not help the forces that want a solution based on the agreed framework and is strengthening those forces seeking a two-states solution. This further distances the prospect of the solution and brings us closer to the final partition.

The history of the Cyprus problem since 1974 demonstrates that the most serious fait accompli arise during periods of a gap in negotiations. All the more so that this time, the UN Secretary-General has relieved Turkey of its responsibilities. It was therefore to be expected that the continuation of the stalemate would lead at some point to new unacceptable fait accompli, which we have before us today.

The Akinci proposal, which is obviously backed by Turkey, further exacerbates the situation and distracts from the real issue which continues to be the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. It seems that your repeated assurances that we are ready for a resumption of the talks and their continuation from where they had remained at Crans Montana, in the way they are conducted, have not convinced the Secretary General of the UN.

The Akinci proposal is falls short first and foremost because it disconnects the issue of natural gas from the efforts for a solution of the Cyprus problem. It aims to “solve” the issue of the hydrocarbons without any prospect for a comprehensive solution appearing on the horizon. If this were to be accepted, it would not only lead to the discarding of this important incentive so we can reach a solution, but would function also as a counter-incentive. Besides this of course, there are other unacceptable provisions that do not permit the acceptance of the proposal.

However, we believe that the negative response to the Turkish Cypriot leader’s proposal should be accompanied by the expression of a readiness for a resumption of the negotiation procedure on the basis of the Guterres framework from the point where we had remained at Crans Montana, with cross-negotiations of the six core issues at the two different tables. The goal should be to reach a strategic co-understanding as soon as possible, which essentially would be tantamount to a countdown for an overall settlement. You must reflect on why the Secretary-General of the United Nations has so far not been convinced of our side’s will and you should be doing everything necessary for the UN to be convinced that this time “the process will lead to progress that will be meaningful ” (recent report of the Secretary General on the renewal of the mandate of the UNFICYP). For sure Turkey’s drillings render this goal difficult, but we are firmly convinced that if the Secretary-General is convinced, then Turkey will either find a way to at least suspend its provocative actions and give space and time to the talks, otherwise it itself will stay exposed.

At the same time, in your response, you must proceed to moves in the direction of addressing some concerns of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey on the issues of Natural Gas, without of course going beyond our red lines. You could declare that if the strategic understanding is reached, something which in practice will make the overall solution unavoidable, then the issue of the involvement of the Turkish Cypriots in natural gas issues could be discussed. This responds to their persistent demand for co-management irrespective of the solution, while at the same time not it does not eliminate the catalytic effect of this issue on the effort for a solution. Apart from this, if we all mean what we say about a continuation of the talks from where they had remained, it is evident that it will soon be apparent whether or not a conclusion is feasible or not. This is because, as you yourself have repeatedly declared, we have come very close on all the issues. I remind you that you yourself had submitted a proposal in the same spirit long before Crans Montana, saying that all the outstanding issues could be discussed at a final stage of the negotiations.

With regards the incentives for the Turkish Cypriot community, the Christofias-Talat convergences must be reconfirmed which were reconfirmed by You and Mr. Akinci on the maritime zones, the natural resources and the sharing of federal revenues. These in reality will resolve the natural gas issue simultaneously with the solution of the Cyprus problem.

We believe that a move that would not leave Turkey indifferent is a commitment that we are ready, after the solution of the Cyprus problem, federal Cyprus and Turkey to begin talks on delimitation on the basis of the UN Law of the Sea. And that regardless of the course of this negotiation, federal Cyprus and Turkey will begin talks to conclude a mutually beneficial agreement for the transportation of gas to Turkey with a pipeline either for its own use or for transportation to other destinations.

Lastly, in your reply, we believe that you will have no difficulty in accepting the establishment of a Common Hydrocarbon Fund, recalling that legislation for such a Fund has already been enacted and indeed without the right to disbursements, precisely due to the abeyance of Cyprus problem.

You will also have no difficulty in recalling that with the solution of the Cyprus problem, the Turkish Cypriot community will have a say on hydrocarbon issues due to its effective participation in the bodies and decisions of the federal government. We believe that developments demonstrate that it is imperative on our part to reconfirm the convergence for a single positive vote in the Council of Ministers, and not the persistence on shrinking it, indeed including the issues concerning the hydrocarbons. You could also reconfirm the convergence that the issues of the hydrocarbons will be included in those where special majorities in the Senate will be demanded.

We are firmly convinced that if your reply includes the above elements, it can stir the still waters, while in the worst case it will convince the international community of our good intentions and transfer the pressure on to the Turkish side. On the contrary, if the reply is limited to a rejection of the Akinci proposal and simply substantiates our position, then Turkey will gain ground in the diplomatic arena too, as the international community will most probably not understand us. The situation will deteriorate if the Turkish side makes a move on Varosha, regardless of its content, because it will be seen as a second initiative.

The immediate resumption of the negotiation procedure is a pressing need, otherwise the fait accompli will continue and the tension will be increasing. At the same time, Turkey’s suffocating embrace of the Turkish Cypriot community will continue, while the forces that want and are seeking a solution are increasingly becoming weaker and the voices in favour of a two-state solution growing stronger. It is evident that so long as all that I have mentioned previously is taking place, the danger of the definitive partition will become increasingly greater.

The fact that the decision about how you will reply to Mr. Akinci is your exclusive right is respected. Our request is that you should think very seriously about how you will reply. Time is unfortunately running out and the dangers are enormous for our country and our people.

Yours sincerely,

Andros Kyprianou

General Secretary of the C.C. of AKEL”