Interview with Toumazos Tsielepis, on the Cyprus problem after the three party meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York
Sunday 2nd October 2016, “HARAVGI” Newspaper
Interview on the critical phase of the ongoing negotiation procedure on the Cyprus problem after the three party meeting with the UN Secretary-General in New York with Toumazos Tsielepis, International Law expert, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of AKEL, Head of the Cyprus problem Office of AKEL, former member of the Negotiating Team during the Demetris Christofias administration and current member of the Support Team to the Greek Cypriot negotiator at the talks.
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The tripartite meeting (between the UN Secretary-General, President Anastasiades and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Mustafa Akinci) has ended in New York. What is AKEL’s initial assessment of where we are, the given situation and the recent statements of both sides?
TT: Always on the condition that we expect to be briefed by the President, our own impression is that the tripartite meeting in New York did not include any surprises. We did not expect that this meeting would solve the remaining differences, nor that the Turkish Cypriot side’s long-standing position for a road map, timeframes and so on would have been accepted. The UN Secretary-General has experience on the Cyprus problem and could not but fail to take past experience into account. You remember when the two successive meetings were held in Greene at Greentree the UN Secretary-General himself concluded that the conditions for progress were not ripe because Eroglu had in the meantime wrecked all the basic convergences recorded.
Very correctly, the UNSC did not pursue the logic of artificially speeding up the procedure, but now both sides must redouble efforts to achieve further progress. Obviously a climate must not be cultivated that we have supposedly triumphed over Akinci simply and just because, as was to be expected, Akinci’s positions for a speedy roadmap weren’t accepted. The difficult issues lie ahead, the Cyprus problem remains unresolved and you realize that the coming weeks will be very critical for the fate of the current negotiating procedure, which has lasted eight whole years.
Certain circles and forces say that the convergences recorded were on the easy chapters, while the difficult chapters such as the property and territorial issue and of security are pending. In recent days we ascertain that on these three issues the Turkish side publicly insists on positions which would be difficult to accept.
T.T: Which issues are easy and difficult is relative. The chapter on Governance and Power-Sharing, where significant progress has been registered, is not easy at all. It is a huge and complex chapter. There were also difficulties on the chapters of the Economy and the EU. Furthermore, the chapter on the property issue is extremely complex and the passage of time makes it increasingly hard to solve.
The chapters on the territorial issue and security are critical and demand major political decisions, but they are neither complicated, nor time consuming. Therefore, whether a chapter is easy or difficult depends on what angle you look at it. Undeniably, on these chapters, the Turkish Cypriot side persists on positions that cannot be accepted and if it does not change its stance I can’t see how we could have arrived within range of a convergence.
On the issue of Security and the Guarantees we have a proposal from each side. Is there likely to be a convergence or a combination and can an agreement be reached?
T.T: The issue of security will be resolved only if the well-intentioned concerns of both communities are met. We are concerned about an external danger, that is to say Turkey. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots are afraid of an internal danger, namely the Greek Cypriots. I will not compare sizes, nor will I say who is right and who is wrong. What is important is how each community sees and feels the danger. Starting, therefore, from the position that the concerns of both communities must be met, we inevitably must accept that the safety of one community cannot be safeguard in a way that the other community feels a threat. It is within this context that we must try to find the compromise.
Turkey up till recently insisted on maintaining the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and in effect it did not agree to discuss anything different. At some stage it said that it would discuss the matter and that it doesn’t consider the text of the Treaty of Guarantee as sacred. We waited to see what it would do in practice. Turkey came up with an informal, in fact unacceptable proposal and we started discussing among ourselves whether it is better or worse than the Treaty of Guarantee.
But isn’t it worse than the existing Treaty in force?
T.T: This isn’t the essence, but rather the shift from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. From the moment Turkey shifted its position, for us it was to be expected that their subsequent position would be the one that was submitted. For us it is unacceptable, but it still represents a crack in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey is not accustomed to saying its last word at such an early stage. I don’t say this by chance, we had experienced this at the time of Bürgenstock. Turkey will say its last word at the very end – if of course we do reach that stage – in the substantive discussion on the issue of security. However, we still have a way to go on the property issue. We also have the territorial issue and we have some pending business on the rest of the chapters. Turkey will state its final position precisely here, at the very end. For now at least it is insisting on its positions, it will insist on the troops and on guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot federated unit
How should the ordinary citizen perceive the statements issued by the Turkish side and Mr. Akinci on this issue, which frighten the ordinary citizen?
T.T: These statements understandably frighten ordinary citizens. However, I reiterate that these statements are to be expected. The truth will be seen in the last stage. We do not want Turkey to be a guarantor power, we do not want it to have rights of intervention or to maintain troops in Cyprus. They know this very well. At the same time, we must declare our readiness to meet the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot side. The Turkish Cypriot’s concerns are not met just by internal means because, I repeat, they consider the danger is internal.
Did you raise this issue when the AKEL delegation went to Turkey?
T.T: We did raise this issue. The reply was that Turkey discusses the issue, therefore it does not consider the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as unchangeable and that it understands that the Greek Cypriots fear Turkey. I am saying what they said to us, I cannot know if they mean it in practice. They also told us that we must also recognize that with regards a solution to the Cyprus problem the Turkish Cypriots also raise the issue of security as well, that is to say they fear the much bigger population numbers of the Greek Cypriot community. They are afraid of the events of the past and they also want to be safeguarded. Our reply was that AKEL is the last who won’t recognize that they too have an issue of security that must be met. What we now have in practice is a new proposal, unacceptable to us, but nevertheless a proposal that moves on from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
The property issue looks as a very difficult chapter. It’s said that the Christofias – Talat convergences have been adopted, that the remedies concerning the various cases have been accepted, as well as a list of 20 categories that will govern each case. What is the reality and how difficult is it really to solve this problem?
T.T: From the time of the talks between Christofias and Talat the property issue has proved a chapter on which we had not registered significant progress on and there were reasons for this. It is a sensitive issue that has to do with the properties of a large number of our compatriots, while the passage of time creates additional complications. The well-known ECHR Dimopoulos judgment occurred in the midst of the negotiating procedure, which adversely affects basic negotiating positions of the Greek Cypriot side. To these difficulties one must add the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side, until recently at least, stubbornly refused to discuss the territorial issue in a substantive way before the other chapters of the domestic aspects of the Cyprus problem are closed. But if there are two chapters that are interlinked and must be discussed together, these are the territorial and property issue.
Consequently the territorial issue is not connected with the issue of security, as the Turkish side claims, but it is logical that the territorial issue should be related with the property issue.
T.T: Yes, because from the solution of the territorial issue the size of the property problem that remains to be resolved will be ascertained. Despite all this, even so, some convergences were achieved. A few but important convergences. It was recognized that the properties belong to the owner, not the user. It was recognized that there will be three remedies: restitution, compensation and exchange. A categorization of properties was indeed also done, which we should not be confused with the restitution criteria, many of which had also been agreed. It was agreed that a property commission be established, which would handle all these issues. Since then there has been further progress recorded, but we are some distance from being within range of a convergence.
So therefore the methods of remedy have been agreed, but there is disagreement…
T.T: There is a fundamental disagreement on who has the first option. To say there are three remedies is important, but who chooses the first remedy? We say that first the owner must choose, The Turkish Cypriots say that the user must choose and this is where we stumble. Of course there are other disagreements as well.
So it was not the case that it has been finalized that the owner has the first say?
T.T: Some progress was made on this issue, but it is still a significant point of disagreement.
The issue of restrictions is raised which as it is said effectively denies the right of return and ownership?
T.T: Our position is that owner first chooses the remedy. If the owner chooses compensation or opts for an exchange, you realize there is no problem. If the owner chooses restitution, then he/she will have it provided that the restitution criteria are fulfilled. There is a possibility of someone choosing restitution, but this being impossible for various reasons. For example, where on empty land a hotel or an apartment building was built, what will you do? Will you return it to the owner? The same also applies to us. Will you return the land on which they built the Larnaca and Paphos airports to the Turkish Cypriot owners? We will compensate them, there is no other solution. So then you can choose restitution, but not to be able to have it. The battle is being waged on what the criteria will be. We want the criteria to be reasonable and as limited as possible. The Turkish Cypriots are trying to extend them. There is good progress but there is still a way to go on this issue.
Why is the territorial issue so important?
T.T: It’s natural that each constituent state (as occurs in all federations) to demand as many territory as possible under its administration. In Cyprus, however, the territorial issue has an additional significance in comparison to other federal states, given that there was the forced displacement of populations and there is also the property issue in the middle. With territorial adjustments, those who would return under Greek Cypriot administration would not be subject to the criteria mentioned. They will get their property back.
That is to say, they will automatically get their property back? Will the Turkish Cypriots and settlers living in this region be relocated automatically? Where will they go?
T.T: There will be a reasonable timeframe. Where would you send them? They must be rehabilitated somewhere and then move. It is perfectly reasonable. But the bottom line is that the more Greek Cypriots return under Greek Cypriot administration, and therefore get back their homes and their property, the smaller the size of the property problem that remains to be dealt with under Turkish Cypriot administration. That is the reason why we cannot agree at all with a logic that prevails in the Turkish Cypriot side that argues that 12 years have passed, properties have been developed and basic freedoms will apply unhindered, so, they say, what does the territorial issue matter? With this logic we do not get anywhere. Without substantial territorial adjustments and without the return of properties there is no solution of the Cyprus problem. They cite the inconvenience of moving. We understand, this is not an easy thing. There are Turkish Cypriots who will move to a second and third time, but if we want a solution, this will be their own share of the price they have to pay.
Would a Turkish Cypriot residing in a Greek Cypriot village under occupation or a Greek Cypriot residing in a Turkish Cypriot village in the free areas, be able on the one hand to move from the property he/she owns, but remain in the specific place?
T.T: Of course he/she can. If the lawful owner wants back his property and the restitution criteria are fulfilled, the user cannot but give it. From there on, the user will be free to go where he/she wants to live, to acquire property, and develop a business or work. You cannot send anyone to go by force under Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot administration. Nobody drives them out, they must just have to return the property. However if the owner does not want restitution and wants compensation or an exchange, the user will have the first say.
Are these agreed?
T.T: Yes, I think basically they are agreed.
- “The content of the solution will determine the continuity of the Republic”
Some circles and forces are concerned about a possible abolition of the Republic of Cyprus and they are claiming that we are heading towards the abolition of the Republic…
T.T: Whether we will have a continuity or abolition of the Republic of Cyprus will be determined by the contents of the solution and not merely from verbal declarations. The state continues to exist if its participation in international organizations such as the UN, the EU and so on continues and an application is not resubmitted. The second is whether the state’s international agreements will remain valid.
In addition, in our case the prohibition of secession is also agreed. We shouldn’t be looking for this issue in symbolism, such as the flag, the anthem, etc, which perhaps give a certain prestige. They have absolutely no bearing on the continuity or succession of a state. So, if we one day reach a plan, every citizen, instead of listening to what various forces and circles will be saying, must in fact look at the agreement itself and see for themselves whether what I said will apply. If they do apply, then it means that there is continuation of the state.
