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Interview with Toumazos Tsielepis: “Negotiations on the Cyprus problem must continue from the point they had remained at Crans Montana”

24 October 2020, weekly newspaper “EPOCHI” from Greece

 

* Toumazos Tsielepis is a member of the Central Secretariat, the Political Bureau of AKEL and Head of the Cyprus Problem Office of the C.C. of AKEL.

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Your initial comments on the election results on the Turkish Cypriot side?

TT: In the end, Turkey’s flagrant intervention, which has always existed, this time surpassed all previous interventions. By exerting pressure on voters, with actions such as with Famagusta, the reopening of the water pipeline for the second time, and even through bribery, this all led to the marginal result. We take note, of course, that the majority of the Turkish Cypriots evidently voted for Akinci. The settlers gave the victory to Tatar, even though a section of them voted for Akinci. There was concern among voters about what would happen if Akinci was elected and that Turkey’s financial support would be cut. Hence, all this led to the marginal result. However, that’s the situation we face and we must handle it.

Won’t the fact that the result was marginal have an effect?

TT: Turkey must take this into account, because the majority of the Turkish Cypriots have indeed turned their backs on Erdogan, who had employed all his personal prestige in favor of Tatar. He should logically take this into account and in all probability he can’t be that pleased.

I see, Anastasiades and Tatar exchanged wishes…

TT: This had to be done, bearing in mind, of course, that we have before us a Turkish Cypriot leader who disagrees with the agreed framework of the solution, namely Bi-Zonal, Bicommunal Federation and is seeking the final partition of Cyprus. Tatar’s recent statements were not at all encouraging, as he essentially is insisting on a two-state solution.

So there is a danger that the basis of the negotiations will change?

TT: Let’s wait a while. I don’t know if he will raise it. This will depend on Turkey. We are now talking about a leader who, in reality, is an instrument of Turkey. This is the noticeable difference with Akinci. What is at stake right now is to be able, if we succeed in doing so, but we also do not have any other option, to bring Ankara to where it had remained at Crans Montana and not to the positions it was expressing after the collapse at Crans Montana.

Whether we succeed or not – it is very difficult anyway – also depends on what President Anastasiades himself will do. We need now to be extremely consistent to the agreed framework of the solution of the Cyprus problem, in what we say that the negotiation must continue from where it had left off, because this is the only way to test Turkey. It is the only way to find out, that is, whether Turkey is genuinely willing to return to where we had remained at Crans Montana or whether it will persist on its current positions, in which case we will be driven to a new deadlock.

This is also the core of AKEL’s position, I believe.

TT: AKEL’s position is that we do not have any other option. We must continue the effort, nothing is over. There is an impression that everything is over with Tatar, that we won’t avoid the final partition. AKEL does not share this view. We have no right to give up, we must continue. Of course, realising that the situation is now much more difficult, because three years and four months were lost from Crans Montana onwards without any negotiations, even though we had Akinci as our interlocutor. However, we cannot turn back the clock.

We must proceed with these facts in mind and I repeat, the negotiation must continue from where it had left off. If Turkey is not ready for that, then at least let them be the ones to be exposed. We should not see Reports of the UN Secretary General such as the one submitted in September 2017, which relieved Turkey of responsibilities for the stance it adopted at Crans Montana. This matters for what will subsequently follow.

Why did the President opt for a stalemate on the Cyprus problem?

TT: From the day after the collapse at Crans Montana, AKEL was persistently repeating on a daily basis that the resumption of the negotiation procedure as soon as possible was a pressing need. The recent history of the Cyprus problem, from the Turkish invasion onwards, confirms one thing: the worst results always occurred in times when there was no negotiation procedure underway. Indeed, now the danger was much greater, because for the first time the United Nations stated that Turkey was not responsible for the breakdown at Crans Montana. We should have expected that the prolonged stagnation would lead – and indeed is leading – to new fait accompli, such as those in Famagusta, in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus and if the deadlock continues, more fait accompli will follow.

The President was right to always talk about resuming talks and continuing from where the negotiations had remained, but then he subsequently set terms and preconditions that were annulling this position. And of course we had the serious fait accompli on the part of Turkey. All these actions/positions were discouraging the Secretary General of the UN from proceeding with a new procedure. He was not convinced that we were genuinely ready to proceed in the way he himself had proposed. And he had proposed it correctly, there was no other way.

One wonders why, in the time between, the Greek Cypriot side hadn’t unilaterally accepted Akinci’s moderate proposals. Would a path had been paved?

TT: Akinci, since April 2018, had proposed the continuation of the procedure from where it had remained, with the goal of an agreement on the Framework of the Secretary General being concluded and thus to arrive at a strategic understanding on the core chapters of the Cyprus problem. This would have meant, as you understand, that we would be counting down for a solution. We, as AKEL, advised the President of the Republic to respond and to do the same. Unfortunately, this did not happen and somehow three and a half years were lost. The question now is what we do from here onwards.

In Greece – and internationally – many analysts consider President Anastasiades to be a rejectionist. Are they right?

TT: After Crans Montana, but also during the conference on Cyprus, there were handlings made with which we did not agree with. This is very clear. Our disagreements with the President of the Republic had gradually begun to emerge from Mont Peléran onwards and they reached a climax at Crans Montana. I do not want to characterize him, namely to say that he belongs to rejectionist school of thought (on the Cyprus problem) or any other school of thought. Let me remind you that during the first year of his first term, he followed the same erroneous policy as today. When Akinci defeated Eroglou in 2014, Mr. Anastasiades followed the correct line and we of course backed the procedure. Gradually, from Mont Peléran onwards, the President took a stance with which we as AKEL anything but agreed with. His policy must be judged now by its end result and the results are very negative. We see it in front of us. It means that something is wrong, that the line followed must change. This is even truer today, with Tatar at the helm of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Let’s suppose there will be a reshuffle by the President. AKEL is a powerful force. Do you see any prospect in the informal five-party meeting?

TT: We may not even get there. The Secretary General of the UN, I believe, will try to ascertain whether both sides accept what he has proposed. That is, we will not start negotiations from scratch on the basis of another framework, but that we will continue from where we had remained at Crans Montana. If the Secretary General concludes that both sides, or at least one of them, does not accept these proposals, we may not even arrive at the informal conference. And if we do get there, that’s precisely where intentions will be ascertained and it is by no means certain that a substantive phase will subsequently follow. That is what we must be aware of. Of course, the big question is what Turkey will do, which from Crans Montana onwards is acting in a way that shows anything but good intentions.

How do you assess the multilateral conference that the EU, especially Mrs. Merkel, proposes?

TT: At present its content has not been clarified and we must not confuse it with the perceived informal conference on Cyprus. In such a conference, as it has been vaguely proposed so far, unsolvable problems will arise especially for Cyprus. We should participate, of course, but we will face before of us Turkey’s insistence, who will be there, on not accepting the Republic of Cyprus or at the least Turkey will not accept our own participation without Turkish Cypriot participation and things become extremely complex. The immediate goal, therefore, must be the conference on Cyprus.

Alexis Tsipras will almost certainly pay a visit to Nicosia. In his statement after the results of the voting procedure of the Turkish Cypriot side, he in fact brought back his proposal – something that the Left, all of us, have neglected – namely that the peoples of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey must mobilize themselves for a peaceful coexistence and that the diplomacy of the peoples should operate.

TT: That’s a very correct position. The peoples must also mobilize themselves to prevent the final partition, which, among other things, in essence will lead to land borders between Cyprus and Turkey. We therefore need to mobilize the peoples, to prevent partition, but also because they will decide, by their vote, whether or not a proposed solution is accepted. The people must be prepared correctly and not be misinformed and the solution demonized.

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Interview with Toumazos Tsielepis: "Negotiations on the Cyprus problem must continue from the point they had remained at Crans Montana"