Interview with Toumazos Tsielepis, member of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of AKEL, Head of the Cyprus Problem Office of AKEL and International Law expert
Sunday, 20th December 2020, “Kathimerini” weekly newspaper
What really happened at the Crans Montana conference on Cyprus
What happened at the ill-famed working dinner at Crans Montana and AKEL strongly criticizes the Anastasiades government? Hasn’t the time come perhaps to say clearly what actually happened?
TT: We were not of course at the working dinner itself, but not even on the margins. The President of the Republic sent us from the afternoon to the hotel where we were staying separately from the core negotiating team. In the many years that I have been dealing with the Cyprus problem, in one way or another, this is the first time something like this has happened. Usually the negotiating team was somewhere nearby, even in another room.
Why did the President leave you out?
TT: It was his right and he chose to do so. The fact that we were not in the working dinner, of course, does not mean that we have no idea what had taken place. By that time, after all, as a member of the negotiator’s support group, I was among the six that were attending the conference. But even in the former Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Kotzias’ interview with the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK), a serious admission emerged.
Which is?
TT: Mr. Kotzias said that by the time of the working dinner, Turkey had consented to the termination of the Treaty of Guarantee and consequently to any intervention rights, as well as to the speedy withdrawal of the occupying troops, with a monitoring mechanism from the United Nations. But everything was subject to the overall package. Turkey’s position was that it would not formally commit with regards the Treaty of Guarantee if the internal issues were not agreed upon as well, with particular emphasis, of course, on the issue of political equality. That was the understanding. Mr. Kotzias claims that all of a sudden Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Cavousoglou remembered that the ‘Gray Wolves’ would cause him a problem and he 180 degrees change of course. This raises an issue of common sense at this point. If indeed during all those days we had arrived at this point and suddenly the Turkish Foreign Minister changed his stance completely, then why did the Secretary General of the United Nations, in the Report he submitted in September 2017, not only did it not blame Turkey, but exonerated it too and apportioned the responsibility on the two leaders? And why did the President of the Republic not react?
But you adopt Mr. Kotzias’ narrative that everything was agreed before the working dinner. Isn’t this contradictory?
TT: There is nothing contradictory whatsoever in what I have said. The understanding was that there would be no formal written commitment by Turkey before the internal issues were agreed upon and that the only issue that would remain and concerned the international aspect, was the issue of the ELDYK and TOURDYK contingents that are in Cyprus according to the 1960 Treaty of Alliance. This issue would be discussed by the Prime Ministers (of Greece and Turkey) either at the conference or elsewhere. Besides in any case, you understand that the issue was not the 950 and 650 soldiers (of ELDYK and TOYRDYK). The important thing was the Treaty of Guarantee. Consequently, the Secretary General of the UN is correct in stating that we came very close to an agreement on all the issues, including on the issue of security and guarantees, and that a historic opportunity has been missed.
What had taken place? Was the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras really ready to come and Anastasiades prevented him at the last minute?
TT: Both Prime Ministers were ready to come to discuss the only outstanding issue of the international aspect, namely the question of the contingents. However, from the moment the negotiation broke down there was no point in them coming (to the conference).
Why do we consider that Turkey was ready for a solution when at the moment it is talking about a two-state solution?
TT: This is a question of evaluation. It appears that the international players of the Cyprus problem had reached the conclusion that their own interests too made a solution to the problem imperative. They obviously thought that for there to be a solution, the Greek Cypriots must be fully satisfied on the issue of security and, accordingly, the Turkish Cypriots must be satisfied with regards the issue of political equality.
Already from Mont Peléran 3, Britain stated that the Treaty of Guarantee must be abolished from the day after the solution and that it is an anachronism that such systems exist. They weren’t even accepting a transitional period. This stand of Britain, the United Nations, the EU, Greece and Cyprus also continued at the Crans Montana conference. Turkey found itself in a tight corner. From the first day of the conference, Cavousoglou submitted a verbal proposal on the issue of the Treaty of Guarantee. When he finished, he characteristically said that he would go further, but not before seeing the Greek Cypriot side’s stance on issues relating to the internal aspect. The proposal did not satisfy us because it did not abolish the Treaty of Guarantee, but the intervention rights were removed. It was therefore obvious that if we wanted to make use of the momentum, also taking into account the attitude of the others, we would have to see what we were going to do on the issues relating to the internal aspect (of the Cyprus problem). The sticking point was the issue of political equality.
What should we expect after Crans Montana? Was it really the last chance for a solution of the Cyprus problem within the framework of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation?
TT: We must never stop struggling for solution, liberation and reunification, even though we are in a very difficult situation today. What would happen after Crans Montana was totally predictable, if we had learnt lessons from the history of the Cyprus problem. When did we have the worst fait accompli from 1974 onwards? We had the worst fait accompli when there was no negotiation procedure underway. We saw this with the proclamation of the pseudo-state, with the rejection of the UN Chief de Cuellar “indicators”. We saw it again in 1997, when we had all the big empty talk surrounding the S-300 missiles and the propagation of the “active volcano” theory, always in the absence of any negotiations, when Turkey and Denktash were officially announcing their position in favor of confederation. We saw it in 2004 with the persistent efforts for direct trade.
The current stance of Turkey and Mr. Tatar shows that they are returning to policies that they were pursuing up until 2003. Until then, the policies they were following, despite the fact that they were not always developing this rhetoric on the negotiating table, was the policy of two states. When Turkey realized that it was not possible for a second state to be recognised on the island and when it began to be interested in its own European perspective, it changed course. Turkey ousted Denktash and since then have begun negotiations on the basis of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation. Of course, they were always putting in some way a lot of confederation elements, which we were neutralizing as we were moving forward.
Does Turkey mean it or is it bluffing?
TT: I do not have an answer. This question can only be answered at the negotiating table. If Turkey does mean it, you understand that we are entering uncharted waters again.
Is the two-state solution therefore a difficult scenario?
TT: Achieving a solution between two officially recognized states is far-fetched. This, of course, is different from the de facto integration of the occupied areas, which is happening before our very eyes and represents an equally dangerous development. But if we ourselves agree with an open or covert two states solution, then no one can prevent it. It goes without saying, this would be a catastrophic development.
Is confederation feasible?
TT: We are concerned because there exists a prevailing atmosphere of having a common representation internationally but on the internal front to function in essence as two separate states. This would constitute a confederate formation, an anachronism of the 19th century that has not survived anywhere. The last example of the 20th century was a brief confederation settlement between Egypt and Syria that lasted just two years. It is no coincidence that these formations are collapsing. It is not a sustainable formation, nor does it correspond to modern realities, international organizations and other forms of cooperation. Such a formation is categorically rejected by AKEL.
