Interview with Stavri Kalpsidiotou, member of the Cyprus Problem Office of the C.C, International Law expert and member of the Central Committee of AKEL

17th July 2020, “GNOMI” weekly newspaper

What practical significance do you attach to the recent ratification of the East Med construction agreement by the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus? Does this move help speed up the construction of the pipeline?

SK: International competition for the control of energy resources is not a new phenomenon. If you go back many decades, you will see that most of the confrontations and conflicts around the world have occurred in areas rich in energy deposits and/or exploitable precious minerals. It is for that reason natural and absolutely imperative that all states should try to safeguard and protect their natural resources from intrusions on the part of third parties and obviously to make use of them.

The Republic of Cyprus could not deviate from this totally logical approach and that is precisely why since 2003 it has very correctly proceeded to draw up Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreements with its neighboring states. Unfortunately, the delimitation was not followed by the completion of announced co-exploitation agreements, such as the one that has been under discussion with Israel for some years.

The question that arises in relation to the construction of the East Med pipeline is twofold: namely whether it is from a technical and economically viable point of view synergy and whether it enables the Republic of Cyprus to make use of natural gas as an incentive for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

As regards the first issue, it does not appear that the experts have reached a conclusion yet. The immense technical difficulties that arise due to the sea abyss around Crete and the seismicity of the region significantly increase the financial cost of the East Med pipeline construction, which is not covered by the current natural gas prices. This also answers your question with regards the practical importance of the ratification by the Parliament of the relevant agreement, which so far remains a statement of political intentions.

Regarding the second issue, it is obvious that the escalation of the tension on the part of Turkey is also being done within the framework of its belief that it is being excluded from energy plans in the Eastern Mediterranean. And this state of affairs is anything but conducive to the resumption of a dialogue for an overall solution to the Cyprus problem.

Regarding the energy program of the Republic of Cyprus. The impression is that it has been frozen, while Turkey, via its President, states that its activities with Turkey’s research vessels in the Cyprus EEZ are consolidating its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

SK: I do not think there is anyone who doubts, taking into account all that we have seen happening in recent years, Turkey’s intention to continue to blackmail the role that it itself wants to play in the region. As you correctly point out, every day we are subject to very provocative statements that confirm this. It is now clear, and this is what I mean when I say that Turkey will continue to blackmail in order to play the role it wants, namely that it is taking full advantage of the tolerance being shown by the international community over the years to intervene as a “player” in all major issues the region is facing, even ‘instrumentalising’ the refugee issue.

Since 2014, with the first examples of Turkey’s malicious intentions against the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus in demarcated maritime zones, as AKEL we had submitted in the European Parliament, and managed to pass, a relevant resolution denouncing them. In the period that followed, when the negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem had reached a climax, the situation eased. After the collapse at Crans Montana and in the absence of any negotiations, Turley’s provocative actions intensified and since then its actions and violation of the Law of the Sea to the detriment of the sovereign rights of the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus are continuing unabated.

In this context, the difficulties that the Republic of Cyprus is called to address so that it can proceed substantially with its energy program are objectively growing. The incident with the Italian energy company ENI in March 2018 is indicative. This specific and other subsequent violations were followed by some condemnatory statements, in the course of which the EU created the framework for imposing sanctions on natural and legal persons without Ankara never having been strongly held to account because of the numerous interests involved. We essentially were witness to the same situation also in the aftermath of the irrational and illegal Turkey-Libya agreement. Neither have the recent statements made by the EU High Representative Borrell revealed the prospect of a more firm stance on the part of the EU.

Therefore, perhaps instead of one-dimensionally pinning all hopes on the international community imposing sanctions against turkey, we must re-assess the importance of the solution of the Cyprus problem also in relation to the goal of completing our energy program. And the time frame for this, so long as the goals for the use of RES are naturally consolidated, is definitely not infinite.

What about the international community’s response to what is happening in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus?

SK: I will not reiterate what I have already said with regards the energy program of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey’s illegal actions. I will underline, however, the international community’s responsibilities, and in this specific case of the EU, to assist in a practical sense towards the upholding of international law. The Law of the Sea is to a large extent an acquis of the EU too. It is, therefore, the EU’s obligation as a community of states, but also of each and every one of its member states, to defend international legality against the neo-Ottoman interpretations given to it by Turkey, which, violating customary law, disputes that the islands have the right to a continental shelf and an EEZ. Of course, the UN has the same obligation too, which unfortunately we note repeatedly that it avoids denouncing Turkey’s illegal actions.

Given what we are witnessing today in Cyprus (both land and sea), what are your views on President Anastasiades’ infamous statement calling on Turkey to limit itself – as he said – to the EEZ of the occupied territories, in conjunction with the information over the previous period according to which he was discussing a two states solution?

SK: Anastasiades’ statement was unprovoked. This may indicate that it was not a mere slip of the tongue, but rather an underlying approach, linked to the prospect of a solution of the Cyprus problem. It is also a fact that this statement was made at a time when rumors were rife that Anastasiades was discussing a two-state solution. And I hope this is a coincidence in bad taste.

As to the substance, when a President of the Republic of a semi-occupied homeland, who declares that he wants to reunite the country, makes statements that constitute an abandonment of the sovereign rights of the state he heads, this is particularly serious and must be judged. I do not think there is anyone who does not know that sovereign rights, including those stemming from the Law of the Sea, belong only to states and the only state in Cyprus is the Republic, regardless of the fact that it cannot exercise effective control over the territories occupied by Turkey, as I also do not think there is anyone who does not realize how damaging such statements are. Precisely because such statements provide a pretext for Turkey’s partitionist designs, which accepted a discussion surrounding a federal solution only in 2003, whilst it has never abandoned, according to Turkey’s Foreign Minister Cavusoglou, the possibility of any form of partition.

How do you evaluate the level of diplomatic actions (as far as you know), to assist the efforts – if they are being undertaken – to breach the stalemate and ensure the continuation of the talks from the point where they had remained at Crans Montana?

SK: We all know that in reality three years ago, after the collapse at Crans Montana in July 2017, the negotiations froze and with them the prospect of a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. Since then, various attempts have been made to break the deadlock, without, unfortunately, the desired result of the resumption of substantive negotiations.  It is a fact that the escalation of tension in relation to the EEZ and energy has created a very negative peripheral atmosphere. But it is also a fact that neither within the island itself was there a substantial attempt to promote rapprochement on the part of the two leaders. On the contrary, after Crans Montana, an endless blame game took the place of dialogue.

The tragedy of this situation lies in the fact that during the Crans Montana Conference on Cyprus, we had arrived very close to an agreement on the core aspects of the Cyprus problem. It is no coincidence that to date, the UN Secretary General has not ceased reiterating that the last mile remained to be covered and that the talks must resume from where they had remained. And if this message does have many recipients, they include Mr. Anastasiades who, among other things, for the past three years, insists on systematically questioning the important convergence recorded on the effective participation of the two communities in the organs of power and on decision-making, and has reopened the question of the state system and generally and vaguely stirs up the question of the federal government’s competences.

Undoubtedly, the Berlin agreement reached last November represents a window of opportunity, which is not expected to open before the voting process in the occupied territories. Of course, this does not mean that the Greek Cypriot side has the luxury to just wait until then. On the contrary, in the intervening period, there are two big challenges facing the Greek Cypriot side.

The first is to convince the international community that it is ready to enter into a negotiation procedure that should have a clear direction and meaning, as the UN Secretary-General is precisely seeking. This is how we will avoid statements such as that of Mr. Borrell who downgrades the Cyprus problem as a dispute between the two communities for the sharing of the revenues from the natural resources.

The second and no less important challenge is to rekindle the hope of the people for the liberation and reunification of our people, not just because 46 years after the twin crime of the coup d’état and Turkish invasion committed in 1974 the hope is still alive, but because it is the force that can support and give a real impetus to the effort for a solution based on principles and – since we don’t express our position in a void – more specifically from where we had remained at Crans Montana.

What’s your opinion on the results of the last EU Foreign Affairs Council with regards the escalation of Turkey’s illegal actions?

SK: The discussion in the European Council followed Borrell’s contacts in Nicosia and Ankara. During the visit of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to Cyprus, the Anastasiades-DISY government cultivated a somewhat festive atmosphere. This climate lasted about as long as his visit. This was followed by his visit and statements in Turkey and subsequently by the conclusions of the Council, which came to confirm the correctness of AKEL’s assessment on the lukewarm stance of Cyprus’ European partners compared for example to how Russia was treated. In essence, the imposition of sanctions on Turkey has been postponed – and not for the first time. Although the magnitude of Turkey’s aggression and its illegal actions were underlined, there was no immediate decision taken for any further measures.

The verbal intentions instead of practical and substantive solidarity reveal and reaffirm the importance the EU and numerous member states attach to their military, economic and trade cooperation with Turkey, even to the detriment of the sovereign rights of other member states. Without any illusions about the character of the EU, which has never ceased to be a club of inter-systemic interests and rivalries, this development worries us. We are concerned, because in the absence of strong measures being transmitted and a firm diplomatic effort to de-escalate tensions, it is very doubtful whether Turkey will stop its illegal and provocative actions. But also because the continuation of this situation raises more obstacles for a resumption of the substantive negotiation procedure for a solution of the Cyprus problem.