Interview with Stefanos Stefanou, member of the Political Bureau of AKEL
25 December 2020, “HARAVGI” newspaper
“It is inappropriate, wrong and dangerous for the Greek Cypriot side to be calling for decentralized federation at this time”
- By proposing decentralized federation, do you or do you not see the danger of slipping towards a confederation solution so we can meet Turkey’s demand somewhere in the middle?
SS: In the modern world there are decentralized and centralized federations. This is not a matter of principle. However, excessive decentralization can lead to two states or to a confederation. Having said that, it is inappropriate, wrong and dangerous at a time when the Turkish side is now officially raising the issue of a two-state solution, for the Greek Cypriot side to call for decentralized federation. In any case, it was wrong to bring back the proposal for decentralized federation, because that clashes with the position of the Secretary General of the UN for safeguarding the convergences that have been recorded, which it sets as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations. The debate on decentralized federation refers to the issue of competences, which has essentially been agreed between the two sides.
- Can decentralized federation be a way of definitively moving away from the one positive vote of the Turkish Cypriots in the Council of Ministers, when the latter is agreed and what is at stake is the return to the talks from the point where the two sides had remained and with all the convergences that have been recorded up to Crans Montana?
SS: No matter how much decentralization may take place, there is no way to move away from the one positive vote in the Council of Ministers. It is wrong to try to backtrack from the convergence for a single positive Turkish Cypriot vote in the federal government. The backtracking undermines the Greek Cypriot side’s credibility towards both the international community and the Secretary-General of the UN.
Therefore, instead of the President of the Republic looking for ways to pull back from this very important convergence recorded, he must reaffirm it in order to convince the UN Secretary General of his willingness to proceed to the resumption of negotiations. Otherwise, the President will facilitate the Turkish side in avoiding the resumption of negotiations and will be assigned responsibilities in the event of a possible deadlock. Let me remind you that the issue of effective participation (of the Turkish Cypriots) was the precondition that was being set by the Turkish side at Crans Montana for it to accept the abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee and the speedy withdrawal of the occupying troops.
- Can the Greek Cypriot side take back Varosha and remove Turkey from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by putting on the table of the five-party conference Confidence Building Measures?
SS: At the point where we have reached, the most effective way to save Varosha and put an end to Turkish provocative actions in the Cypriot EEZ is the resumption of negotiations. This is precisely where the President must focus his effort on without any ambiguities and regressions that have cost so much over the recent past. To strengthen the prospect of resumption of negotiations, which should lead to an overall solution to the Cyprus problem, as AKEL we have submitted a comprehensive proposal to the President of the Republic. We hope that he will adopt and promote it, thus serving the perspective of the solution of the Cyprus problem that will take us out of the deadlocks, liberate and reunite our country and people.
- After the last European Council, do you consider that the logic of imposing sanctions by the EU on Turkey has finally been exposed?
SS: No sanctions policy can have any prospect of success if it is used as an end in itself. And unfortunately this was done by the Anastasiades-DISY government, apparently to serve the management of communication needs on the domestic front after the catastrophic failure of the government’s supposed “shielding” of the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus, which the government strongly advertised as having been ensured with the convening of the tripartite and four-party meetings.
There are many reasons why the government has failed to convince Cyprus’ European partners for substantive sanctions to be imposed on Turkey: Firstly, because since the collapse of the Crans Montana conference it has so far not been convincing the international community of its sincere will to proceed to negotiations and the solution of the Cyprus problem in the way suggested by the United Nations. Secondly, because the Anastasiades government did not take into account the big strategic and economic interests that powerful EU countries have with Turkey. Thirdly, because it did not realize the EU’s priorities in relation to Turkey at this stage.
The EU seeks to keep the channels of communication for dialogue with Turkey open on the basis of a positive agenda. The Anastasiades government, trapped in its illusions and regressions on the Cyprus problem, instead of making use of the positive agenda policy, invested in the game of sanctions and in the end Cyprus was isolated.
