Interview with Stavri Kalopsidiotou, member of the Cyprus Problem Bureau, International Law expert and member of the Central Committee of AKEL
Sunday, 9th August 2020, HARAVGI newspaper
Without a dialogue for the delimitation of an Exclusive Economic Zone between Greece and Turkey the deadlocks will deepen
“If the negotiations do not resume and the Cyprus problem is not resolved, then it is more likely, unfortunately, that Turkey will continue its blackmailing activity in our EEZ and exhaust the time frame for the exploitation of natural gas, either with terms of marketability or by fulfilling the goals for the use of Renewable Energy Sources as a long term perspective”
“Although the delimitation of maritime zones as we understand them today was included in the international legal field long after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, we cannot but denounce the fact that Ankara, starting from the dispute over the continental shelf, gradually pursued a policy of multiple challenges, legally and historically groundless”
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Greece in a possible Greek-Turkish dialogue says that the only disagreement that must be discussed is its continental shelf. Turkey, however, has not revealed what it intends to do. Will it raise other issues too? What developments do you foresee?
SK: It is a fact that the major issue between Greece and Turkey is the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which automatically also means a delimitation of the continental shelf. This is a dispute that dates back to the first time that Turkey formally disputed the legal status of the sea area of the Aegean in 1973, fifty years after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne.
Although the delimitation of maritime zones, as we now understand them, was included in the international legal field long after Lausanne, we cannot but condemn the fact that Ankara, starting from the dispute surrounding the continental shelf, gradually pursued a policy of multiple challenges, legally and historically groundless. Unfortunately, the prolonged difficulty in resolving the issue of the continental shelf further fuels this policy, which extends to the breadth of Greek airspace, to the status and militarization of islands of the Eastern Aegean.
Today, Ankara does not confine itself to engaging in its provocative rhetoric, but worse still with illegal methods and practices is violating fundamental principles of general international law and the Law of the Sea in particular. We hope the exploratory meetings that appear to be under way will offer a way out of this crisis, making use of the acquis of Helsinki (1999), where they agreed in principle on the need to delimit the EEZ through bilateral negotiations and if they did not arrive at a conclusion by early 2004, through a joint appeal to The Hague. If this time the necessary political will is demonstrated and the effort is not abandoned by either side, then we can expect an outcome on the major dispute which is delimitation. And if there is an agreement on delimitation, it will as a result facilitate the addressing of Turkey’s challenges in the Eastern Aegean in general.
International analysts argue that the strategy of co-operation on the axis of hydrocarbons is wrong. How do you judge this strategy by its results?
SK: For as long as the need for the use of hydrocarbons does not disappear, the relevant cooperations will not cease developing, nor, of course, the related rivalries as well. The question that should concern us is how long hydrocarbons will still represent a useful asset and consequently how within this context we will succeed in making use of them. Taking into account, of course, that as their commercial value and use decreases, so will the possibility of utilizing them for the benefit of the solution of the Cyprus problem, which for us is what is at stake and the pressing need. Unfortunately, without ignoring Turkey’s aggression, in recent years the handlings of the Anastasiades-DISY government have not been the appropriate ones.
After the last visit of the President of the Republic to Paris, do you think that Athens is much further away from Cyprus than Paris?
SK: It is the customary practice of every elected leadership to undertake diplomatic initiatives that promote the country’s well-intentioned interests and in times of crisis, the rapprochement with states that play a significant role in regional and/or international developments becomes even more necessary. With the footnote that the Cyprus problem in any case already makes the continuous development of a multilevel and multidimensional foreign policy imperative. And like us, each state shapes its cooperations in a way that it deems will serve its own priorities and addresses its own challenges – on the precondition that they are abide by international law. This is a self-evident right for Nicosia, this is what Paris does and this is what Athens does too, which of course remains the main pillar of support of our struggle.
However, I will expand on your question to stress that what concerns us most is what priorities guide the Anastasiades-DISY government in the cooperations it is seeking. Given that the strategic goal of the solution of the Cyprus problem has been dangerously stuck due to the absence of negotiations in recent years and Turkey’s escalating provocative actions, the one-dimensional persistence in applying policies that do not facilitate the de-escalation of tensions increase our concerns. All the more so, given that if there is someone who can live with the deadlocks created by the tension and militarization, without even paying as it turns out any cost, it is Turkey itself.
Turkey will continue to use its military superiority to prevent the completion of our energy program, to promote the colonalisation of Varosha, assimilate the Turkish Cypriot community and to deepen at a fast pace the final partition of Cyprus.
Since in our view setting any other priority does not overcome the disaster of a definitive partition, we will tirelessly warn that as long as the disorientation continues, as this is manifested through the militarization of cooperations/alliances and the delusions being cultivated of their “deterrent effect”, the prospect of a solution of the Cyprus problem will continue to become more distant.
Turkey is not going back on the agreement with regards the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, but on the contrary it is issuing a warning that it will enter into similar agreements with other countries too when given the opportunity. How do you comment on that?
SK: Who really questions, bearing in mind all that we have seen taking place in recent years, Ankara’s intention to continue blackmailing the expansionist role it wants to play in the region?
As regards this specific agreement, as has been said repeatedly, it touches on the boundaries of hilarity. It is irrational and illegal. A quick look at the map of the region is enough to confirm that the main opposite state with Turkey is Egypt and not Libya, but also to determine the magnitude of the provocation for Greece. Since, in complete violation of the International Law of the Sea and the relevant case law, the agreement considers as non-existent the islands of Crete, Rhodes and Karpathos.
At the same time, the illegal Turkish questioning of the effect of islands on delimitation is also expressed in the coordinates Turkey has submitted to the UN and concern Cyprus. However, in the absence of a dialogue to resolve these disputes, it is being demonstrated that confrontations are intensifying and the deadlocks are being sealed.
In our case as well, a solution of the Cyprus problem must precede for the perspective of a dialogue or an appeal to The Hague to be paved. Views arguing for a unilateral appeal (to the Hague) have already been characterised as legally unfounded and misleading. If the negotiations do not resume and the Cyprus problem is not resolved, then it is more likely, unfortunately, that Turkey will continue its blackmailing activity in our EEZ and exhaust the time frame for the exploitation of natural gas, either with terms of marketability or by fulfilling the goals for the use of Renewable Energy Sources as a long term perspective.
Doesn’t the absence of the US from these developments in the region appear strange to you? Or have they perhaps sealed their presence with the notorious Rubio-Menendez legislation?
SK: The US are anything but absent from our region. The ways in which American interests are being promoted vary. To the extent that they are directly involved with Cyprus, an indicative development is the recent acquisition of the Noble energy company by the American energy giant company Chevron and even more so Cyprus’ accelerated military embrace as a result of the bill you referred to. The lifting of the embargo in the sale of arms which many cite to justify the importance they attach to it, should have been decided on the one hand, but for reasons of justice. Conversely, this bill serves the geostrategic objectives of the US and more specifically for the control of the region, given that it presupposes a reduction – if not the termination too – in the relations of the Republic of Cyprus with Russia.
At the same time, it implies the granting of military facilities to the United States and it transforms Cyprus into a platform for its expansionist plans. Added to this are the rumors that are circulating widely about the military use of the British bases, raising the reasonable question of whether this is being done with the consent of the Cypriot government as the Treaty of Establishment sets out. Russia’s stance on the issue of double taxation may not be irrelevant to all that we are seeing. But what is certain is that the consequences of the dogmatic and erroneous policy choices pursued by the Anastasiades-DISY government will be paid by the Cypriot people, we hope not within the UN Security Council too where the support of all the five permanent members is necessary with regards the Cyprus problem.
Response to the Turkish-Libyan memorandum
How do you assess the recent Greece-Egypt EEZ delimitation agreement?
SK: This is an agreement that was expected, which constitutes an exercise of sovereignty of the two states since the distances between them render such a delimitation imperative. It is, of course, a partial delimitation that does not directly affect Cyprus, but it replies to the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, indeed in a way that should lead Turkey to draw the correct conclusions as to the legal options available for delimiting the EEZ in the wider region between all the affected countries.
