Interview with Toumazos Tsielepis, member of the Political Bureau of AKEL, Head of the Cyprus Problem Office of the C.C. of AKEL and International Law expert

Sunday 5 August 2018, “Haravgi” newspaper

Are you genuinely optimistic that the negotiation procedure can be revived with real prospects for a positive outcome of the talks?

TT: It is not a question of optimism or pessimism. It is a question of the two leaders’ stand with regards the new effort by the United Nations for a revival of the negotiating procedure. If both sides respond positively to the call issued by the UN Secretary-General – which is specific, not general and vague – the procedure will move forward. If, however, the Secretary-General does not get a positive and convincing reply from both sides, it is obvious that he will not be able to proceed. This will be reflected also in the Report that he will be submit on 15th October. Consequently, it is a question of the stand of the two leaders, which I cannot know.

What is it that can measure positively and did not exist before the breakdown at Crans Montana?

TT: What did not exist before the collapse at Crans Montana was the aspect of the security – guarantees issue. Remember that two critical chapters had remained almost fully stagnant, namely territory and security – guarantees that the Turkish Cypriot side traditionally did not want to discuss. It wanted to leave these issues to the end of the procedure, at the final stage as it was stating. At one point, Mr. Akinci said that this final stage is never coming and so we have to move on. The territorial issue was discussed at Mont Peleran in two rounds with encouraging results, while the issue of security was discussed at Crans Montana. What did not exist before Crans Montana is the progress that has been achieved there with regards the security – guarantees issue.

Progress in what sense?

TT: In the sense that both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the EU and Britain, and of course Greece too, had a clear position at Crans Montana: the Treaty of Guarantee and the intervention rights must be terminated from the first day of the solution and there should be a rapid withdrawal of all the occupation troops, with a monitoring mechanism by the United Nations. This is what transpired from Crans Montana and unfortunately it has not been made use of.

Do you consider that the Greek Cypriot side has sufficiently demonstrated its readiness for a resumption of the talks? From the briefing you may have also from the recent meeting of the Council of the Heads of political parties, maybe you are able to assess the situation…

TT: To be honest, I can’t know what the President of the Republic has said to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Cyprus Mrs. Lute, nor would it of course be correct to reveal what was said during the meeting of the Heads of political parties.

However, I can say with certainty that what the UN Special Envoy herself was expecting to hear was not the Greek Cypriot side’s narrative about what happened at Crans Montana. What the Secretary-General was expecting to hear from his envoy is the conclusion on the issue at stake. That is to say, whether we are indeed ready to give a clear and official answer to the Secretary-General’s position on how the procedure should proceed. I do not know what happened as regards this issue. That’s the reason why I cannot say whether the negotiation procedure will resume or not. Moreover, we are in the dark about what the Turkish Cypriot side has said also.

“Every time a negotiation process is due to resume, and especially when the negotiation procedure is in progress, an attempt is made to revive the ambient atmosphere, with the main characteristic being scaremongering and the phobic perception of the talks”

Shouldn’t the new negative ambient atmosphere that appears to be developing even before it seems whether the talks will resume or not worry us?

TT: Of course, it should worry us, but I have to say that we are accustomed to such developments. Every time a negotiation procedure is going to resume, and especially when the negotiation procedure is in progress, an attempt is made to revive the ambient atmosphere, with the main characteristic being scaremongering and the phobic perception of the talks. It demonstrates hesitancy in proceeding towards a solution on the basis of the agreed framework. And this is the same atmosphere we are witnessing right now with the difference, of course, being that this time the procedure was entirely Cypriot-owned and the argument regrading arbitration doesn’t exist.

The stand taken by the Presidential Palace during all these periods is of course decisive. It is the Presidential Palace’s position that tilts the scales in one or the other direction. It is the one that favours or doesn’t favour an ambient atmosphere. And the least I can say in this regard is that the Presidential Palace has big deficits/shortcomings.

Will Turkey in particular take the additional steps the international community expects from it?

TT: Whether or not Turkey will take the steps that the international community expects of it can only be revealed at the negotiating table. What we have before us is the international community’s will which was very clear on the issues regarding security and guarantees, as well as the UN Secretary-General’s impression that Turkey had cooperated at the Crans Montana conference.

We therefore have to do all we can to resume the negotiation procedure, because that’s precisely where the UN Secretary-General’s view will be confirmed that either Turkey has cooperated hence we can proceed or Turkey will dispel the UN Secretary-General’s impression. And in that event, Turkey itself will have the problem.

So that is where we will solve our questions, namely at the negotiating table. We will not find answers to our questions beforehand or even more so by putting forth demands for Turkey to undertake commitments on the core issue of security before we go there. This would be a form of “protaxis” policy (Note: the policy of setting “preconditions” that predetermine the results of negotiations), which never yielded good results. Whenever the tactic of putting forward issues, inventing new terms and preconditions has been applied, this has always led to negative results and, as a rule, to new and serious fait accompli.

The UN Secretary-General, following the collapse at Crans Montana, directly attributed to both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership a lack of political will. How can this deficit be complemented?

TT: In the Reports of the Secretary-General submitted following the collapse at the Crans Montana conference on the one hand Turkey is praised for its stand on issues related to security – guarantees, and on the other, responsibilities are assigned on both leaders for the breakdown. Why do the Reports assign responsibilities on both leaders? Evidently, the UN Secretary-General has formed the impression that there was an opportunity to resolve the issue with guarantees, intervention rights, troops, and we did not take it. On the other hand, the Secretary-General clearly believes that the Turkish Cypriot side, from the moment Turkey retreated on the issue of security and guarantees, tried to benefit on issues regarding the internal aspects. Of course, it was agreed that everything is a package and we shouldn’t have and must not stick to the mentality that the security-security issue must first be resolved and then we’ll see the other issues.

From there onwards, as regards the four issues of the internal aspects (of the Cyprus problem), advanced convergences between the two sides were recorded. There was an attempt by the Turkish Cypriot side to retract from these convergences, and it is for this reason that the UN Secretary-General assigns responsibility on both leaders. I do not assess here if this behavior was fair or unfair, I judge it because, according to the logic of the Secretary-General, both leaders are responsible.

What would a decision on the possible withdrawal or reduction of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus mean for our cause?

TT: The question of the peacekeeping force is no longer theoretical. It is a real existing danger and we are fully aware of it. The United Nations peacekeeping force came here in 1964 for a short period of time. Over half a century has gone by and UNFICYP is still here. Attempts were always made, if not to withdraw, to reduce its force and curb its powers/competences. These attempts were being made mainly on the part of Britain.

Today, the US is also entering this game in a dynamic way. They raise the issue of course in general not only about UNFICYP, considering that where a problem exists, but a peace procedure isn’t underway, then the peacekeeping force must leave. In the last resolution (on the mandate of the UNFICYP), the US attempted to link UNFICYP’s presence with the solution of the Cyprus problem. Fortunately, the UN Secretary-General in his previous Report warned of the consequences of such an action on the eve of the effort for a resumption of the talks.

If the new effort of the UN Secretary-General does not yield results, a reverse course will be set in motion in January. The danger is that decisions will be taken that we will not like at all. Consequently, this is an additional reason for the Greek Cypriot side to do everything possible for a resumption and successful outcome of the negotiation procedure because the issue at stake is to arrive at a solution, but if we do not manage to do so, at least the responsibility will not be assigned on us. This is also related to whether UNFICYP will remain or whether its role will change. If UNFICYP leaves, it will be to our detriment because the other side has the occupying troops.

• “It is not a viable option to believe that we can live undisturbed in half of Cyprus, but Greek and think that “Let the Turkish Cypriots on the other side do whatever they want”

If with his Report to be submitted in October the UN Secretary-General doesn’t launch a new procedure – for the obvious reasons – what will be the consequences in relation to the issue of hydrocarbons?

TT: In mid-October, the UN Secretary-General will submit a Report to the UN Security Council. Our goal must be that the Report marks the resumption of the negotiation procedure. If the Secretary-General concludes that there aren’t any preconditions for the resumption of the procedure, or even worse, if he assigns responsibility on the Greek Cypriot side, you realize what will subsequently follow. There will be immediate consequences – we have already mentioned one consequence, namely that the presence of UNFICYP will be questioned – and a second serious consequence will be in relation to the hydrocarbons issue. It is obvious that Turkey will start drilling – I do not know exactly where, but for sure at some point within the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It should concern us if it is done within the Cypriot EEZ, even if it is not within our licensed plots.

In such a case there will be a severe tension, which could develop into a crisis. The worst of all is the possibility of second thoughts being made on the part of the international community that the Cyprus problem is now a frozen conflict that cannot be solved. And because the status quo is not acceptable – and correctly so – what does this mean? If no solution is reached on the basis of the agreed framework, other solutions will be sought. And I’m not referring to the direct official recognition of the illegal pseudo-state. It is possible that an attempt to upgrade the illegal regime of such magnitude is made that it will no longer be reversible. Partition is not a viable option. It is not a viable option to believe that we can live undisturbed in half of Cyprus, but one that is Greek and think “Let the Turkish Cypriots on the other side do whatever they want”.

And who flirting with the idea of ​​a “velvet divorce” would do well to realize that a “velvet divorce” does not exist in the case of Cyprus. And since you ask me about the consequences as regards the hydrocarbons issue, let me just say that in the event of partition, about 60% of the Republic of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone will pass into the hands of the illegal pseudo-state.

“Whenever the tactic of putting forward questions, setting terms and preconditions has been applied, it has always led to negative results and, as a rule, to new, and serious fait accompli”

Does not the fact that the democratic deficits in the Turkish state are constantly growing exacerbate the feeling of insecurity among the Greek Cypriot community?

TT: Indeed, the democratic deficits in Turkey are growing. And of course, to the extent that these democratic deficits are growing, the concern among the Greek Cypriots is also growing about what will happen in the event of a possible solution of the Cyprus problem. This is perfectly normal.

From there onwards, however, we must know that if we truly want to liberate and reunite this country and this people, if we want to get rid of the occupation, the only way to achieve it is at the negotiating table. That is where we have to assert and claim our positions, and it is the only way to get rid of the military presence of Turkey in Cyprus, which is what is at stake and the pressing need.

The position of the international community on this issue, I repeat, is identical with ours. It is a positive position and we must try to make use of it. Otherwise, we will be left with the occupying troops, there will be a dividing line of 180 kms and you understand the danger we will be faced with in case of such a development…