Cyprus problem: Why the demilitarization matters by Stavri Kalopsidiotou
The resumption of the direct negotiations in Cyprus comes at a time when the war- torn region of the southeast Mediterranean needs a true success story for peace. The assumption of the Turkish Cypriot community’s leadership by a determined pro- solutionist, Mustafa Akinci, deepens our hopes and resets the momentum for a Cypriot owned solution. Taking stock of Turkey’s illegal occupation of the northern part of Cyprus for the last 41 years and the continuous human rights’ violations against both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, the current negotiations shall revolve around the core internal aspects of the problem. Turkey on the other hand, is the key actor expected to take concrete measures and allow the people of Cyprus to determine their future in their common homeland. Hence, the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus, a just solution on the issue of illegal settlers and the revocation of the anachronistic regime of foreign guarantees, all depending on Turkey’s true commitment for a solution, are of immense importance.
Among the issues debated in Cyprus in relation to the content of a negotiated solution is the demilitarization of the island. A brief historic review regarding the official positions of the Greek Cypriot side demonstrates that demilitarization has never been the goal only of the Left. In 1989 the goal of demilitarization was included in the unanimous decisions agreed by the National Council[1]. On 17th December 1993 Clerides[2] submitted to the UN Secretary-General a proposal for the demilitarization of Cyprus. In 2002 the current Foreign Minister also acknowledged in statements he issued that demilitarization constitutes an important parameter for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The National Council in its unanimous decisions approved in September 2009 reiterated precisely the same goal. Additionally, the inclusion of the sought goal of demilitarization in numerous resolutions of the UN Security Council, [i.e. in Resolution 1251 (1999)] that was adopted during the Clerides (right wing party) administration has often been registered as a success.
What has therefore changed that wasn’t before us in the past? In reality, nothing has changed. However, certain circles and forces are evidently exploiting the Cyprus problem in order to promote their ideologically- driven views on the security issues. With the position of certain circles and forces against demilitarization being covered with a European disguise, it is being argued that Cyprus’ participation in the security and defense policy of the European Union (CSDP) presupposes the existence of an army, thus making demilitarization impossible. Nothing is further from the truth.
The EU does not need the five or six soldiers attributable to Cyrpus for its missions. Neither however is our participation in the so-called humanitarian missions, the few that are not carried out under the leadership of NATO, dependant on the existence of a Cypriot army. In peacekeeping operations, search and rescue missions to provide assistance to affected areas by human-made and natural disasters the management of crises, the participation and co-synergy of the federal Republic of Cyprus can be safeguarded through doctors, functionaries and expert technocrats.
However, why does this so obviously evident fact escape the attention and knowledge of all those invoking an EU obligation? Perhaps it is because they simply disagree with demilitarization, or it is because the expediency that is hidden behind the pretext in question concerns the perspective of Cyprus coupling with NATO through the establishment of NATO guarantees or even Cyprus’ future participation in NATO. However, once again, why are the ramifications of such positions so difficult to understand? Or to put it differently, why does the demilitarization matter?
The result of the abandonment of the principle of demilitarization automatically paves the way for Turkey to assert through the solution the permanent presence of a significant number of its troops in Cyprus. Furthermore, any army in Cyprus will possibly be mixed with equal proportions, as well as a rotating Commander in Chief. Can Cypriots accept this perspective, bearing in mind the bitter experiences of the past? Unarguably, one of the main arguments in rejecting previous peace plans was human insecurity. And certainly, this remains one of the issues that will play a decisive role in the success of any future plan put in referendum.
The promise for citizens’ security and the overcoming of the real and psychological obstacles of insecurity created by the Turkish invasion and 41 years of military occupation can only be attained through demilitarization. All the above, explain profoundly why quite rightly no previous President of the Republic of Cyprus did abandon the position for demilitarization by accepting the existence of guarantor powers with sovereign rights to the detriment of the Cypriot people, or the presence of troops after the solution.
In conclusion, a warning. All those who are in a haste to abandon the long-standing position in favour of demilitarization, by flirting with membership of NATO, the presence of military structures on the island, the continuation of hegemonic foreign guarantees or the existence of unilateral rights of intervention, let them above all reflect on how they will solve the Cyprus problem without the support of a large section of the Cypriot people.
By Stavri Kalopsidiotou, member of the Central Committee of AKEL, International Law expert and member of the Cyprus problem Department of AKEL
[1] Advisory body, primarily on the Cyprus problem, to the given President of the Republic composed of all the parliamentary political parties and former Presidents of the Republic. It was established by the late President Makarios after the coup d’état and subsequent Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus.
[2] Glafcos Clerides, former President of the Republic 1993-2003 and founder of the main right-wing and ruling DISY party.
